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INTRODUCTION 
Our national conversation about the propriety of affirmative action revolves 
around a central question: is it appropriate to consider race in allocating 
sought-after benefits and limited resources? The rhetorical positions on each 
side of this debate are familiar. Opponents of affirmative action argue that 
race-conscious decision-making undercuts traditional notions of merit and 
provides less-qualified individuals with access to undeserved benefits. 1 
Proponents reply that purportedly neutral notions of merit are socially 
constructed and entrench an exclusionary system of benefits distribution. 2 
Opponents argue that affirmative action unfairly penalizes "innocent" 
individuals by requiring them to bear the burdens of redressing harms they did 
1 Lino A. Graglia, Professor Loewy 's "Diversity" Defense of Racial Preference: 
Defining Discrimination Away, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1505, 1513 (1999) ("Racial preferences are 
an attempt to overcome the fact that members of the preferred groups are not, in general, 
competitive with whites (and Asians) in terms of the ordinary academic admissions 
criteria."). 
2 Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 752-57 (describing the social construction of merit); Susan Sturm & 
Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CALIF. 
L. REV. 953, 954-56 (1996) (noting that proponents of affirmative action often challenge the 
"fairness and functionality of existing merit standards" because they rely on "exclusionary 
criteria"). 
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not cause.3 Proponents view affirmative action as providing limited 
compensation for age-old injuries caused by a long history of state-mandated 
segregation. 4 
To a large extent, this debate can be understood as a dispute about the 
propriety of viewing the Equal Protection Clause from an individualist rather 
than a group-oriented perspective. 5 Thus, the broad question at the heart of 
affirmative action cases, and anti-discrimination law generally, is whether the 
Equal Protection Clause should protect individuals qua individuals (the 
"individualist discriminatory" framework) or whether it should protect 
members of minority groups precisely because they are members of minority 
groups (the "group rights" or "antisubjugation" position).6 It is now 
abundantly clear that a majority of the current Supreme Court views the Equal 
Protection Clause as a font of individual rights protection rather than as a 
safeguard for minority group interests. 7 Adhering to this individualist 
3 See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 299-308 
( 1990) ( examining the notion of the "innocent white victim" in the context of the affirmative 
action debate). Professor Ross concludes that the "rhetoric of innocence" diverts society 
from what he believes is the crucial question: "how do we get to a world where good people, 
white and of color, no longer suffer because of the accidental circumstances of their race?" 
Id. at 315-16. 
4 David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 921, 958-97 (1996) (arguing that affirmative action can be justified as a 
remedy for present day discrimination and racial disparity in areas such as education, 
employment, housing, health care, economic opportunity, crime and poverty). 
5 Opponents claim that affirmative action protects group rights at the expense of 
individual rights, thereby subverting constitutional norms generally, and the Equal 
Protection Clause specifically. Graglia, supra note I, at 1512 (arguing that the use of 
affirmative action in college admissions is "inconsistent with the democratic principle of 
individual worth"). Alternatively, proponents view the Equal Protection Clause as 
emphasizing racial subjugation and racial equality as guiding•themes rather than focusing on 
colorblindness and individual rights. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: 
A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1334-37 (1986) 
(proposing that the Constitution opposes subjugation, not discrimination, and therefore 
would prohibit even race-neutral policies that have the effect of subjugating a certain race). 
6 Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1335-36 (maintaining that the interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause as requiring color-blind policies is merely a theory, and summarizing 
arguments for and against the "antisubjugation" interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
7 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). In the opinion for 
the Court in Adarand, Justice O'Connor wrote, "[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution protect persons, not groups." Id. (emphasis in original). This portion of 
Justice O'Connor's opinion garnered the support of Justices Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas as 
well as Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. In 1976, with a seven vote majority, the Court held 
that, absent an "invidious discriminatory purpose," a law is valid under the Fourteenth 
Amendment even if it has a disparate impact on minority groups'. See Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229,242 (1976). 
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perspective of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has also limited the type 
of discrimination that government can redress through an affirmative action 
program. Briefly stated, particularized instances of identified discrimination 
are "in,"8 and amorphous claims of societal discrimination are "out."9 
Given the apparent durability of the Court's individualist position, it would 
seem that there is little use in championing an approach that bears even the 
slightest relationship to the group rights position. Fidelity to the individualist 
discriminatory framework in affirmative action cases, on the other hand, 
usually results in invalidation of affirmative action plans. This might be a 
positive development if one viewed the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause 
solely as prohibiting race-based governmental decision-making prospectively. 
However, the aftershocks and reverberations of prior racial discrimination are 
still felt powerfully today because of "lock-in" effects, 10 particularly in the 
areas of housing, education and employment. 11 More economically and 
socially powerful groups may engage in anti-competitive conduct that distorts 
the market for skills acquisition and enhancement, education, jobs, and 
contracting opportunities. 12 Such actions lock-in advantages accrued in a prior 
era, lock-out unwanted competitive pressures, and strengthen and perpetuate a 
powerful advantage/disadvantage cycle encompassing education, jobs, and 
housing opportunitie.s. Thus, even if all decision-makers today were to act 
without regard to race, adherence to the individualist discriminatory 
framework leaves in place the anti-competitive distribution scheme previously 
8 See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989). In Croson, the 
Richmond City Council adopted the Minority Business Utilization Plan (the "Plan"). id. at 
477. The Plan required contractors to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount 
of the contract to a minority-owned sub-contractor. id. The city argued that it intended the 
Plan to remedy a history of discrimination that had reduced opportunity for minority 
entrepreneurs. id. at 498-99. The Court deemed the Plan unconstitutional because it was a 
"rigid racial quota" based only on "an amorphous claim that there has been past 
discrimination in a particular industry." id. at 499, 511. 
9 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986), cited in Croson, 488 
U.S. at 497. In Wygant, the Court invalidated provisions of a collective-bargaining 
agreement between the Jackson Board of Education and the local teachers' union. id. at 
270-71, 273. The agreement provided that, in the event oflayoffs, the percentage of laid off 
employees that were minorities could not exceed the percentage of all employees that were 
minorities, regardless of seniority. id. at 270. According to the Court, because the city 
could no show specific instances of prior discrimination by the governmental unit, the 
provision was invalid. id. at 274. 
10 Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 86 
VA. L. REv. 727, 731-36 (2000) (arguing that the overrepresentation of whites in legal 
education and employment can be explained by the antitrust concept of "lock-in" wherein 
whites exclude minorities and then use their monopoly power to lock-in standards of 
competition that favor whites). 
11 See infra Part II. 
12 See infra Part III. 
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developed---one explicitly based on race. 
This Article suggests that we should view equal protection in terms of group 
status and competition. This view would shift our current approach to 
affirmative action cases away from the individualist discriminatory framework 
and toward a framework that principally recognizes that racially and socially 
defined groups compete for economic and social benefits and resources. This 
competition takes place within an enduring state-sanctioned discriminatory 
scheme legitimated by the dominant culture. From this perspective, we may 
now see affirmative action cases for what they are, namely manifestations of 
intergroup conflict. 
But why should we shift to an approach that emphasizes group status and 
competition, particularly given the Court's clear rejection of a group rights 
approach? One rationale is that the assumptions that might have justified the 
focus on individual discrimination are no longer valid. Significant research in 
social science describes racial inequality as grounded in notions of group 
identity and group conflict. 13 Sociologists and social psychologists who study 
discrimination and prejudice have moved away from theories that explain 
prejudice solely as a problem of individual perception, and toward theories that 
view individual cognitive processes as related to group membership.14 While 
present social science yields no consensus view, there is a striking emphasis in 
the current literature on group identity theories as "powerful determinants of 
behavior."15 These theories, which stress the importance of prejudice as a 
group-based phenomenon16 and focus on "social-structural theories of group 
competition,"17 are particularly resonant for our discussion of affirmative 
action and competitive process distortion. Thus, social science scholarship has 
recognized that discriminatory behaviors are not just the result of personal, 
individual cognitive-process distortions, but are a problem of collective action. 
This Article explores this notion of collective action by analyzing the 
process by which blacks and whites compete for resources and benefits. 18 In 
13 David 0. Sears et al. , Cultural Diversity and Multicultural Politics: Is Ethnic 
Balkanization Psychologically Inevitable, in CULTURAL DIVIDES: UNDERSTANDING AND 
OVERCOMING GROUP CONFLICT 35, 40-42 (Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller eds. , 
1999) (providing an overview of group identity and conflict theories); see also RUPERT 
BROWN, PREJUDICE: ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2-14 (1995) ("[P]rejudice is primarily a 
phenomenon originating in group process .... Thus, such intergroup relations as a conflict 
over scarce resources, or power domination of one group by another, or gross disparities in 
numerical size or status can all .. . have crucial implications for the direction, level, and 
intensity of prejudice . . .. "). 
14 See, e.g. , Sears et al., supra note 13, at 40-42; BROWN, supra note 13, at 10-12. 
15 Sears et al., supra note 13, at 40. 
16 BROWN, supra note 13, at l 0-11. 
17 Sears et al., supra note 13, at 41. These theories generally maintain that people 
naturally form groups and those groups inevitability develop "hierarchies of status and 
power." Id. The theories also claim that intergroup rivalry is inevitable. Id. 
18 For the purpose of simplicity, I focus solely on the concept of black-white competitive 
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certain areas, whites as a group have engaged in conduct that can be seen as 
anti-competitive, "locking-in" benefits accrued under a prior, explicitly 
segregated era, and creating barriers to entry that prevent blacks as a group 
from enjoying those benefits. Accordingly, the current debate about 
affirmative action has been woefully under-inclusive, because it fails to 
analyze this underlying competitive framework within which blacks and whites 
compete for economic and social benefits and resources. Furthermore, by 
failing to recognize the competitive dynamics underlying affirmative action 
cases, the courts' decisions have maintained white competitive advantage. 
Anti-competitive conduct by the dominant white group undercuts the goals of 
equality and anti-discrimination to which our society purportedly subscribes, 
and the courts have been complicit in maintaining this structure. 
This Article highlights three areas in which this anti-competitive conduct 
can be seen: employment, 19 housing20 and education.21 Through strict scrutiny 
analysis, recent jurisprudence takes an unduly limited approach to interpreting 
the demands of equal protection. In these three disparate areas, the courts 
engage in a similar strict scrutiny analysis reviewing affirmative action 
programs.22 In each area, the respective court failed to engage in a meaningful 
compelling governmental interest analysis, allowing it to ignore the 
competitive dynamics underlying each case. These courts then jumped to a 
truncated narrow tailoring inquiry, which allowed them to strike down the 
affirmative action plans presented. This approach short-circuits meaningful 
judicial review of the affirmative action plans crafted by governmental actors. 
As a result, the courts leave intact structures that benefit whites at the expense 
of blacks. By viewing cases in these areas through the lens of competition, we 
dynamics. There is a great deal of complexity inherent in any analysis of affirmative action 
and group dynamics, and other racial and ethnic groups compete for resources and benefits 
in similar fashions to the concepts that I discuss. 
19 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. F.C.C., 236 F.3d 13, 15-17 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 122 S. Ct. 920 (2002) (invalidating an FCC regulation that required broadcasters to 
enact recruitment procedures designed to increase minority applications because the 
regulation was not "narrowly tailored to support a compelling government interest"). 
20 Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 981-82, 987-88 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 1131 (2000) (vacating a lower court's order to construct public housing in 
predominantly white neighborhoods because, while motivated by a compelling government 
interest, it was not narrowly tailored in light of other possible non-discriminatory remedies). • 
21 Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools, 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 529 U.S. 10 I 9 (2002) ( ordering an injunction requiring school authorities to permit 
an elementary student to transfer schools after the authorities rejected the transfer 
application because it would upset the "diversity profile"). 
22 Any race-conscious measure receives strict scrutiny under either the Equal Protection 
Clause or the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. E.g., Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Under strict scrutiny, all racial 
classifications must be "narrowly tailored measures that further compelling government 
interests." Id. 
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see that different outcomes are both possible and advisable. 
The Tenth Circuit's most recent decision in the long-running Adarand 
litigation, 23 highlights the approach this Article advocates because the court 
began to shift toward viewing discrimination as a form of anticompetitive 
conduct. This approach allowed the court to engage in a meaningful 
compelling governmental interest inquiry and allowed it to see the ways in 
which discrimination locked-in benefits for one group over time. In beginning 
to use the language of competition, the court was on the right track toward a 
fuller and richer conception of intergroup conflict and anti-competitive 
conduct. By following Adarand's lead and analyzing affirmative action 
disputes through the lens of competition, courts and policy-makers will 
develop a more complete understanding of the dynamics of discrimination and 
will develop more thorough tools with which to evaluate cases and create 
affirmative action policy. 
Part I of this Article discusses the concepts of competition and intergroup 
rivalry. It surveys recent scholarship in the social sciences and highlights 
social identity theory and realistic group conflict and group position theories. 
It focuses on social dominance theory, which analyzes group-based social 
hierarchies. This scholarship provides a sound theoretical framework from 
which we can understand blacks and whites as groups that compete for benefits 
and resources. Part II turns to an examination of the process by which blacks 
and whites compete. It discusses legal scholarship that applies antitrust 
concepts to discrimination law, and it explores the interrelated nature of the 
markets for housing, education, and employment. It then examines the 
economic concept of barriers to entry and explores how this concept applies to 
black-white intergroup competition. 
Part III analyzes three recent cases in the areas of housing, education, and 
employment. In each case, a governmental actor attempts to disrupt the system 
that has locked-in benefits for whites at the expense of blacks. In each case, 
the courts have failed to recognize this attempt for what it is; instead, they 
viewed these efforts as simply unconstitutional race-based preferences in favor 
of minorities. This section of the Article carefully examines the methods the 
courts used to bypass meaningful compelling governmental interest analysis 
and jumped to a cursory narrow tailoring analysis. As a result, the courts 
thwarted the governmental actors' efforts to create even playing fields in each 
of these markets. Finally, Part IV highlights one court that adopts a more 
nuanced approach. In the latest installment of the Adarand litigation, the Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit made a conscientious effort to analyze the 
competitive dynamics undergirding the market for employment in a particular 
area. By doing so, the court engaged in a meaningful equal protection analysis 
which allowed it to come to the correct conclusion. 
23 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 
U.S. 103 (2001) (ruling that revisions to a federal affirmative action program for minority 
subcontractors make the program narrowly tailored and constitutional). 
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I. COMPETITION: RACE RELATIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURAL THEORIES OF 
INTERGROUP RACIAL CONFLICT 
Ideas about competition and fair play are a bedrock of American society and 
culture and permeate every area of our work and play. America's love affair 
with competition goes beyond an appreciation of its value as the core of our 
economic system. Competition and the competitive impulse also stand at the 
core of our culture, acting as part of our "national DNA."24 In nearly 
everything we do---from our leisure-time activities, such as sports25 and 
entertainment,26 to political campaigns27 and business dealings28--competition 
drives how activities are structured, how winners are compensated, and how 
losers are consoled. Along with the norm of competition comes at least the 
formal commitment to "fair play," to an "even playing field," and to the 
promise that the rules of the game will be determined ex ante rather than post 
hoc. Thus, it is in the contestants' best interest to structure fair rules 
prospectively and to adhere to them ( or at least appear to) throughout the 
contest because the competitor seeks not just the prize, but the prestige that 
accompanies a triumph fairly achieved.29 
24 B.W. Powe, Why Tocqueville Still Matters, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 20. 
2001 , at 02, Westlaw, ALLNEWS. 
25 See After the Tragedy, Sports Will be Therefor America, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001 , 
at 2, LEXIS, News & Business, LAT File (quoting a letter from Alvin M. Okamura): 
Sports is our drug. It fills our need for competition, battle-some even call it war. It's 
an arena where the rules are set, the competitors are determined, and even the 
boundaries or playing field become part of our culture. We love it because it's 'fair.' 
26 See Ray Mark Rinaldi & Ellen Futterman, The Trends, The Surprises-and the Disses, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 13, 2002, at El (Everyday Magazine), LEXIS, News & 
Business, SLPD File: 
Americans love the Academy Awards because they ' re all about competition. All that 
talk about fashion and box office and who' s escorting whom to the awards is just a 
showcase for a big showdown. The Oscars take whatever art may be found in a year of 
films and reduce it to a clumsy contest held on one glam night-the perfect 
transformation for our dog-eat-dog dispositions. 
27 A recent article drew an interesting analogy between the current Oscar race and the 
competitive nature of American political campaigns: 
You might liken the current phase of the Oscar campaign to political primary 
seasons .... All campaigns must operate within a set of guidelines intended to promote 
a level playing field . Yet, as in politics, campaigners are always probing for loopholes 
and pushing the envelope to see how far they can go before running afoul of the 
regulators. 
Pat Nason, Hollywood Analysis: What Price, Oscar?, UPI HOLLYWOOD REP. , Feb.4. 2002, 
LEXIS, News & Business, UPI File. 
28 Peter Burrows, Carly's Last Stand?: The Inside Story of the Infighting at Hewlett-
Packard, Bus. WK., Dec. 24, 2001 , at 63, 64 ("[T]hese players will wage one of the biggest 
proxy fights in corporate history--one that could tum especially nasty."). 
29 The controversy surrounding the pairs figure skating event at the 2002 Winter 
Olympic Games in Salt Lake City is illustrative. After allegations that one of the judges of 
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The goal of procedural fairness coexists, however, with the desire to triumph 
over rivals. In business, a voluminous literature provides information and 
guidance to companies eager to develop and maintain competitive 
advantages.3° Companies seeking success in a competitive environment are 
advised to reshape the game's context and to change marketplace rules in order 
to trump over competitors.31 Companies attempt to shape the game's context 
in several ways. First, they create alliances and merge operations to 
"reduce . . . the number of existing rivals. "32 They also use the "courts, 
legislatures, [and] governmental agencies . .. to shape competitive conditions 
to [their] advantage."33 Additionally, they acquire new knowledge, premised 
on superior informational and educational access.34 Changing the game's 
context thus allows competitors to outmaneuver other players, preempt rivals, 
perform tasks more skillfully, and cooperate with other entities.35 Firms also 
exploit the ownership of superior resources,36 use entry barriers to limit the 
number of potential competitors,37 and exploit market position to undercut 
rivals.38 
In a competitive world, winners want to keep on winning, and they 
want to keep the prizes or resources accumulated over the course of many 
games. As winners accumulate resources, they can use those resources to 
change the structure of the game to favor their side. Over time, winners may 
compete only with members of favored groups, create barriers to joining the 
the event was pressured to vote in a certain manner, the International Skating Union 
awarded a second set of gold medals to the silver medallists. The core of the controversy 
revolved around the perception that the result of the competition was predetermined, that the 
"rules of the game" had been violated. Selena Roberts, Canadian Skaters Awarded Share of 
Olympic Gold; French Judge Suspended, Her Scoring Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
2002, Al (quoting one of the newly-named gold medallists: "We're happy that justice was 
done . . . [t]hat doesn't take anything away from [the other gold medallists]. This was not 
something against them; it was something against the system"). 
30 See, e.g. , RICHARD A. D' AVENI & ROBERT GUNTHER, HYPERCOMPETITION: MANAGING 
THE DYNAMICS OF STRATEGIC MANEUVERING (1994); LIAM FAHEY, OUTWITTING, 
OUTMANEUVERING, AND OUTPERFORMING COMPETITORS (1999); BENJAMIN GOMES-
CASSERES, THE ALLIANCE REVOLUTION: THE NEW SHAPE OF BUSINESS RIVALRY (1996); 
CURTIS M . GRIMM & KEN G. SMITH, STRATEGY AS ACTION: INDUSTRY RIVALRY AND 
COORDINATION (1997); LEE TOM PERRY, OFFENSIVE STRATEGY: FORGING A NEW 
COMPETITIVENESS IN THE FIRES OF HEAD-TO-HEAD COMPETITION (1990); KEN G. SMITH, 
CURTIS M . GRIMM & MARTIN J. GANNON, DYNAMICS OF COMPETITIVE STRATEGY ( 1992). 
3 1 FAHEY, supra note 30, at 13. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 14. 
34 Id. at 14-15. 
35 Id. at 19-20. 
36 GRIMM & SMITH, supra note 30, at 103-28. 
37 D' A VEN! & GUNTHER, supra note 30, 114-51. 
38 GRIMM & SMITH, supra note 30, at 131-57. 
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game, and collude with others to undercut the ability of other players to 
compete against them. Winners can invest resources to restructure the rules of 
the game and enhance their chances of winning future contests. At the same 
time, winners maintain that the rules of the game are fair, because to believe 
otherwise would undermine the prestige associated with winning the prize 
fairly. 
Similarly, in American culture, blacks and whites have historically acted, 
and continue to act, as competitor groups. The focus of this competition is 
access to resources, power, and prestige. Historically, whites as a group have 
been the winners of this competition, allowing them to build upon and lock-in 
the advantages of previous successes. Affirmative action programs can be 
seen as a government attempt to assist blacks, as a group, in securing some of 
these benefits. However, in analyzing challenges to affirmative action 
programs, the courts generally fail to recognize this group rivalry between 
blacks and whites. 
Historically, we have seen racial discrimination as the fruit of animus, as an 
individual's irrational action driven by a cognitive process distortion called 
"prejudice."39 The Supreme Court's approach to the Equal Protection Clause 
has been consistent with this idea by requiring "invidious discriminatory 
purpose"40 or "discriminatory motivation"41 as key to a finding of a violation 
of equal protection. At the same time, the Court has focused largely on the 
need to protect the rights of individuals in disputes involving equal protection 
claims rather than concerning itself with the harms experienced by groups as 
groups.42 This approach has reached its apex in the Court's affirmative action 
39 See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 9 (1954) (defining 
ethnic prejudice as "an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization . . . . "); 
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY 40-42 (20th ann. ed., 1962). 
40 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 236-37, 242 (1976) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a police department' s entrance exam because there was a lack of 
discriminatory intent even though four times as many black applicants failed the test than 
did white applicants). 
41 See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (holding that plaintiffs 
stated a viable cause of action by alleging that the Alabama legislature intentionally redrew 
a municipality' s boundaries to exclude all but four or five out of 400 blacks from voting in 
an election). The majority in Gomillion principally reviewed the state's action in light of the 
Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Whittaker's concurring opinion, however, argued that the 
state action violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring). 
42 See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) ("It is the 
individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws."). In Gaines, the School of 
Law at the State University of Missouri refused to admit the plaintiff, a black applicant. Id. 
at 342. The school instead arranged for the student to attend law school in an adjacent state, 
but would not provide in-state education. Id. at 343. The court rejected an argument that 
limited demand relieved the state's duty to provide separate but equal facilities because "the 
petitioner's right is a personal one." Id. at 351. 
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doctrine, which protects the rights of individuals in a way that "trumps" the 
interests of blacks and other minority group members.43 This focus on 
individualism has masked intergroup competition and conflict, and disguised 
the complex interactions that undergird disputes. Unfortunately, the Court has 
not ordinarily viewed racial discrimination as a function of the process of 
rivals interacting to develop and preserve gains. 
Recent work in the social sciences provides a solid theoretical framework 
for analyzing competition between blacks and whites as intergroup conflict. 
Many social science researchers have viewed intergroup relations and 
discrimination as behavior that assists in enhancing a particular group's 
position. This research suggests that the actions of individual whites can be 
seen, in the aggregate, as behaviors intended to protect the interests of the 
group to which the individuals belong. Many sociologists and social 
psychologists have moved toward normative theories of prejudice and 
discrimination that focus on "group categories as powerful determinants of 
behavior. "44 While there is no consensus view among social scientists about 
the causes of prejudice and discrimination,45 several theories have developed 
which emphasize social structure and group interests as keys to understanding 
how and why discrimination occurs. For instance, social-psychological 
theories of intergroup relations and conflict generally place great emphasis on 
"the individual's connection to and embeddedness in the larger social 
context .... "46 Social structural theories focus on the "structural relationships 
among groups" as vital to understanding the roots of prejudice and 
discrimination.47 Both approaches, however, are grounded in the notion that 
groups, and individuals' identification with them, are vital to our 
understanding of the causes of prejudice and discrimination. 
We begin our discussion of recent social psychological and social structural 
approaches to intergroup conflict, by asking two questions. First, why might 
an individual identify herself as a member of one group or another? That is, 
what does an individual gain from a group-based or category-based identity? 
Second, do individuals within groups think that it is important to allocate 
resources to those within their group and to deny resources to outgroup 
members? If so, why? Recent developments in social psychology offer some 
tantalizing responses to these questions. 
43 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U .S. 200, 227 (1995) (stressing that 
any governmental attempt to aid a racial group will be "subjected to detailed judicial inquiry 
to ensure that the personal right of equal protection of the laws has not been infringed" 
(emphasis in original)). 
44 Sears et al., supra note 13, at 40. 
45 See JIM S!DANWS & FELICIA PRA TIO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF 
SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION 3-30 (1999) (analyzing various intergroup relations 
theories). 
46 Id. at 15. 
47 Id. at 20. 
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A. Social Identity Theory: The Importance of Group Membership 
Social identity theory, first developed by social psychologist Henri Tajfel in 
an effort to understand the origins of intergroup conflict, is reflective of the 
post-World War II European approach to social psychology. 48 This approach 
emphasized people's interactions not as unique individuals but as members of 
social groups.49 Social identity theory has had a tremendous impact on the way 
in which social psychologists evaluate intergroup relations, and it has strongly 
influenced the recent resurgence of interest and research in group processes in 
a variety of areas. 50 
Social identity theory posits that an individual's membership in a social 
group or groups is a defining aspect of her self-concept.51 Tajfel defined 
"social identity" as an individual's "knowledge that he belongs to certain social 
groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of his 
membership."52 Thus, social identity is an individual's understanding of 
oneself as a group member.53 Social identity theory is also premised on the 
notion that individuals want to view themselves with a positive, rather than a 
negative, self-image.54 Thus, according to Taijfel, social identity has two 
components: belief that one belongs to a group ( e.g., "I am an American") and 
the importance of that group membership to one's self ( e.g., "and I am damn 
proud to be a citizen of the greatest country on earth"). 55 
Tajfel did not argue that an individual's social identity forms the totality of a 
person's self-conception; rather, an individual's self-conception is complex 
and multifaceted. 56 Instead, social identity theory posits that an individual's 
self-conception should be viewed along a continuum. 57 At one end of the 
48 Michael A. Hogg & Dominic Abrams, Social Identity and Social Cognition: Historical 
Background and Current Trends, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COGNITION 7, 9 (Dominic 
Abrams & Michael A. Hogg eds., 1999) [hereinafter Hogg & Abrams, Social Identity and 
Social Cognition]. 
49 Id. at 9-10. 
50 Id. at 10-11. 
51 HENRI T AJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORJES 255 (I 981 ). 
52 Id. at 258. 
53 Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg, An Introduction to the Social Identity 
Approach, in SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY: CONSTRUCTIVE AND CRITICAL ADVANCES 2 
(Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg eds., 1990). 
54 TAJFEL, supra note 51, at 45 . 
55 Lee Jussim, Richard D. Ashmore & David Wilder, Introduction: Social Identity and 
Intergroup Conflict, in SOCIAL IDENTITY, INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND CONFLICT REDUCTION 
6 (Richard D. Ashmore et al. eds., 2001). 
56 TAJFEL, supra note 51 , at 255. 
57 Id. ("There is no doubt that the image or concept that an individual has of himself or 
herself is infinitely more complex, both in its contents and its derivations .. . . "); see also 
MICHAEL A. HOGG, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP COHESIVENESS: FROM ATTRACTION 
TO SOCIAL IDENTITY 90 (1992) [hereinafter HOGG, PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP COHESIVENESS] 
("Social behaviour and relations among people vary along a continuum .... "). 
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spectrum is the individual's "personal identity," an understanding of one's self 
as a "unique and distinct" individual.58 At the other end of the continuum lies 
the individual's "social identity," a conception of the self as '"interchangeable' 
with other ingroup members and stereotypically distinct from outgroup 
members."59 This end of the spectrum is important because "self-inclusive 
social categories," such as "I am an American," were simultaneously 
descriptive, normative and evaluative. 60 
The cognitive processes of social categorization and social comparison are 
key to social identity theory. Social identity theory posits that social 
categorization and social comparison translate into social behaviors.61 As a 
general matter, social categorizations are the cognitive processes by which an 
individual breaks down socially important information into discrete units-the 
"discontinuous divisions of the social world into distinct classes or 
categories."62 More important to social identity theory, however, social 
categorizations were the cognitive processes by which individuals assigned 
both the self and other people to a "contextually relevant category."63 The 
normative and evaluative function of this process was important, such that 
outgroup members were homogenized, distanced and stereotyped. 64 
Social comparison was the ability to discern among groups differences that 
are grounded in social reality (e.g., differences in status, economic attainment 
or skin color).65 Thus, if an important part of an individual's self-conception 
revolved around group membership, individuals placed significance on their 
group's position vis-a-vis that of other groups.66 As Tajfel explained, "the 
definition of a group (national, racial or any other) makes no sense unless there 
are other groups around."67 From the perspective of social identity theory, 
then, an individual's s9cial identity was only really significant when it was 
possible to compare the standing of the individual's group in a positive manner 
58 HOGG, PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP COHESIVENESS, supra note 57, at 90. 
59 Id. 
60 Michael A. Hogg, lntragroup Processes, Group Structure and Social Identity, in 
SOCIAL GROUPS AND IDENTITIES: DEVELOPING THE LEGACY OF HENRI TAJFEL 67 (W. Peter 
Robinson ed., 1996) [hereinafter Hogg, lntragroup Processes] (noting that self-evaluation 
of a social group's standing forms a relative basis for the evaluation of other social groups). 
61 HOGG, PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP COHESIVENESS, supra note 57, at 91 (arguing that 
group self-assessments translate into not just attitudinal perceptions but ways of behaving 
toward members of other groups). 
62 John C. Turner, Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group, in SOCIAL 
IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 17 (Henri Tajfel ed. , 1982). 
63 Hogg, lntragroup Processes, supra note 60, at 67 (describing the process of 
categorization of people, including oneself, into social groups). 
64 HOGG, PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP COHESIVENESS, supra note 57' at 91 . 
65 T AJFEL, supra note 51, at 258. 
66 Id. at 257-58. 
67 Id. at 258. 
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relative to that of other groups in a particular milieu.68 
Social identity theory, answering the first question posed above, tells us 
what individuals gain by identifying with certain groups. Ingroup 
identification can powerfully enhance an individual's self-evaluation and self-
conception.69 Social categories are related to self-concept, and social identity 
theory suggests that it is not meaningful to speak of the "individual" as a 
socially autonomous creature. It is important, however, to note exactly how 
the individual benefits from ingroup identification. Social identity theory 
suggests that the individual's enhanced concept of self, gained from ingroup 
identification, derives from viewing the ingroup favorably. 70 As Michael 
Hogg has explained: 
Because social categories contribute to the self-concept and thus serve to 
define and evaluate self, we continually try to make intergroup 
comparisons on dimensions that already favor the ingroup. We strive for 
evaluatively pos1t1ve social identity through positive ingroup 
distinctiveness. Social identity theory argues that this reflects a basic 
human motivation for positive self-esteem through self-enhancement.71 
Thus, ingroup favoritism can be seen as the sine qua non of a person's 
"social identity" because "positive connotations of ingroup membership 
become positive connotations of self."72 
In the same way, social identity theory begins to offer a possible answer to 
our second question, which moves from a descriptive inquiry about individual 
self-conception, to a more normative question about how self-conception 
affects behavior. Once again, do individuals within groups think that it is 
important to allocate resources to those within their group and to discriminate 
against outgroup members? Social identity theory suggests that the answer is 
"yes." 
The classic exposition of the effects of social identity is a series of 
experiments conducted by Henri Tajfel (and others) in the early 1970's. In the 
"minimal intergroup" experiments, Tajfel attempted to discover the minimum 
conditions under which an individual would discriminate in favor of her 
ingroup. 73 The experiments demonstrated that social categorization in and of 
itself was all that was necessary to trigger intergroup discrimination.74 This 
68 Id. 
69 HOGG, PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP COHESIVENESS, supra note 57, at 92 (explaining how 
individuals, motivated by their need for positive self-esteem, fulfill this need through group 
distinctiveness). 
70 Id. at 91. 
71 Id. at 91-92 (emphasis in original). 
72 Hogg & Abrams, Social Identity and Social Cognition, supra note 48, at 10. 
73 T AJFEL, supra note 51, at 268. 
74 Turner, supra note 62, at 22-23. In his experiment, Professor Tajfel instructed 
participants to divide money between two other participants. T AJFEL, supra note 51, at 268-
69. The participant knew their group membership and the memberships of those between 
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means that the "mere perception of belonging to a social category is sufficient 
for group behavior."75 The importance of this is the suggestion that an 
individual might engage in ingroup discrimination even where the individual 
does not stand to gain directly from the discriminatory behavior. As John 
Turner has explained in describing the minimal intergroup experiments: 
Group membership was anonymous and there was no goal 
interdependence, social interaction or other basis for cohesive relations 
between members. Nevertheless, subjects discriminated against 
anonymous outgroup and in favour of anonymous ingroup members in 
the distribution of monetary rewards-under conditions where they could 
non benefit from this strategy. They demonstrated group behaviour in the 
form of uniformities in their reactions to others which were consistently 
related to their own and the others' group memberships. These results 
have been extensively replicated at the level of both behavioural 
discrimination and social evaluation. 76 
Later studies suggested that similarity of ingroup members is not necessary 
for either group formation or intergroup discrimination to occur.77 In the 
context of an important social categorization such as a racial grouping, ingroup 
members tend to exaggerate ingroup similarities and outgroup dissimilarities.78 
Moreover, ingroup members are attracted to other members simply because 
they belong to the same group.79 Thus, according to the minimal intergroup 
experiments, awareness of a common membership was the overriding factor 
for individuals to feel and to act as group members. 80 
Guided by social identity theory, we would assert that individuals within 
groups think that it is important to allocate resources to those within their 
group and to discriminate against outgroup members because it contributes to 
their own individual self-conception. Thus, where some social category, such 
as a racial grouping, plays a role in "defining the self, the need for positive 
self-esteem should motivate a desire to evaluate [the ingroup] more 
positively.81 From the social i(\entity perspective, the ingroup may 
whom they were dividing the money. Id. Beyond group membership, the participants knew 
nothing about the other players. Id. Commenting on the results, Professor Tajfel wrote, 
"The results were highly significant in the direction of awarding more money to members of 
the 'in-group."' Id. 
75 Turner, supra note 62, at 22-23. 
76 Id. at 22. 
77 Id. at 22-27. 
78 Id. at 28. 
79 Id. at 22-27 ("We may not form a group with individuals we like so much as like 
people because they belong to our group."). 
80 Id. at 27. 
81 See id. at 33-34 (stating generally that "favourable comparisons between the ingroup 
and an outgroup provide ingroup members with highly subjective status or prestige and thus 
positive social identity .. . "). 
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discriminate against the outgroup not necessarily because there is a realistic 
conflict, but "simply to differentiate themselves and maintain a positive social 
identity for their members."82 
This observation, however, raises an important and related question about 
the nature of the bias. Are outgroup members harmed or discriminated against 
because they are outgroup members or instead as a byproduct of the actor's 
desire to help ingroup members? Several studies suggest that the need to assist 
ingroup members motivates actors more than the desire to harm outgroup 
members.83 This is consistent with the notion, central to social identity theory, 
that group identification enhances an individual's self-concept. Thus, "[a] 
desire for positive distinctiveness can account for preferential hiring of ingroup 
members over outgroup members and for selective investment in projects that 
benefit one's own group over others."84 
B. Related Theories of Intergroup Relations: The Realistic-Group-Conflict 
and Group Position Theories 
Other social psychological theories also suggest that group members' 
perception of group status and position can explain prejudice and intergroup 
discrimination. For instance, in 1965, Donald T. Campbell identified a theory 
of intergroup relations common to a variety of disciplines within the social 
sciences including anthropology, social psychology, and sociology.85 Dubbing 
this approach "realistic-group-conflict theory," Campbell asserted that "group 
conflicts are rational in the sense that groups do have incompatible goals and 
are in competition for scarce resources."86 Thus, according to this theory, 
prejudice and discriminatory behaviors are inexorably tied to group interests.87 
Competition over limited resources explained problematic attitudes and 
behaviors; rivalry for prizes determined the presence and intensity of 
intergroup discrimination. 88 
82 Id. at 34. 
83 See Marilynn B. Brewer, lngroup Identification and Intergroup Conflict: When Does 
lngroup Love Become Outgroup Hate?, in SOCIAL IDENTITY, INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND 
CONFLICT REDUCTION 17, 26 (Richard D. Ashmore et al. eds., 2001) ("(T]he experimental 
literature on intergroup discrimination provides evidence that the primary motivation is to 
benefit the ingroup rather than harm the outgroup."). 
84 Id. at 27 (relating the study of intergroup relationships to real world examples of self-
justified harm to others). 
85 Donald T. Campbell, Ethnocentric and Other Altruistic Motives, in NEBRASKA 
SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 283, 283-87 (David Levine ed., 1965); see a/so BROWN, supra 
note 13, at 163. 
86 Campbell, supra note 85, at 287 (noting that this rational basis for group conflict is a 
central assumption of the realistic-group-conflict theory). 
87 BROWN,supra note 13, at 163. 
88 David 0. Sears, Race in American Politics: Framing the Debates, in RACIALIZED 
POLITICS: THE DEBATE ABOUT RACISM IN AMERICA l, 22 (David 0. Sears et al. eds., 2000). 
Sidanius and Pratto have summarized the realistic-group-conflict approach in the following 
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Closely related to the realistic-group-conflict theory, the group position 
theory also emphasizes power imbalances between groups as a basis for 
prejudice and intergroup discrimination. 89 The origins of the group position 
theory can be traced back to the work of Herbert Blumer. 90 Blumer postulated 
that racial prejudice is a function of one group's position vis a vis the position 
of another group, rather than a function of antipathetic feelings directed at 
specific individuals.91 For Blumer, this shifted the focus from a 
"preoccupation with feelings as lodged in individuals to a concern with the 
relationship of racial groups."92 Racial groups form images of themselves and 
others, he claims, through a collective process.93 Hostility may emerge as a 
defensive reaction when one's sense of group position is challenged.94 Blumer 
maintains that this challenge may come in many forms such as economic 
competition or encroachment into areas previously thought to belong solely to 
one's own group.95 
More recently, some scholars have used the realistic-group-conflict and 
group position theories to explain contradictions in white Americans' racial 
attitudes. For instance, Lawrence Bobo applied realistic-group-conflict theory 
manner: 
[T]he perception that one group's gain is another's los translates into perceptions of 
group threat, which in turn cause prejudice against the outgroup, negative stereotyping 
of the outgroup, ingroup solidarity, awareness of ingroup identity, and internal 
cohesion, including intolerance .of ingroup deviants, ethnocentrism, use of group 
boundary markers, and discriminatory behavior. 
SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 45, at 17 (citing Campbell, supra note 85). 
89 Sears, supra note 88, at 20-21 . The sense of group position theory has been referred to 
as a "social structural" theory of intergroup relations-that is, as a theory that emphasizes 
the "structural relationships among groups" over the individual-level cognitive process of 
individuals. Id. at 20. From this perspective, the group position theory can be viewed as the 
"sociological version of realistic group conflict theory." Id. 
90 See Herbert Blumer, Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position, in NEW 
TRIBALISMS: THE RESURGENCE OF RACE & ETHNICITY 31, 31-40 (Michael w. Hughey ed., 
1998). 
91 Id. at 31-32. 
92 Id. at 31 (arguing that such a shift would "yield a more realistic and penetrating 
understanding of race prejudice"). 
93 Id. In summarizing Blumer's thesis, editor Michael W. Hughey writes: 
Blumer points out that race (and ethnic) prejudice emerges out of the ongoing relations 
between groups, and especially from shifts in a group's sense of its social position 
relative to that of other groups. In particular, the real or imagined social ascent of the 
subordinate group is perceived by dominant group members as an indication of their 
own decline, or as a diminution of their group's honor, resulting in an intensification of 
prejudicial attitudes toward the offending group, often combined with actions designed 
to restore it to its rightful "place." 
Michael W. Hughey, Introduction, in NEW TRIBALISMS: THE RESURGENCE OF RACE & 
ETHNICITY 1, 2 (Michael W. Hughey ed., 1998). 
94 Id. at 35-36. 
95 Id. 
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to whites' attitudes toward busing.96 Bobo argued that white opposition to 
busing was a reflection of structural relationships between blacks and whites, 
as opposed to "a new manifestation of prejudice."97 Bobo emphasized 
members' sense of belonging and status rather than any direct threat posed to a 
particular individual's welfare as keys to understanding the negative 
predisposition of whites toward busing. From this perspective, Bobo wrote: 
As group membership and status play a role in the calculation of 
individual interests, it seems inappropriate to view self-interest or group 
conflict as based solely on objective, immediate threats to an individual's 
private well-being; challenges to group status or position are equally 
important. 98 
Bobo's approach correlated white opposition to busing to a diminution to 
the group's long-term interests.99 Thus, Bobo shifted from a conception of 
prejudice as a product of "preadult socialization,"100 toward an examination of 
how a particular public policy initiative threatened to redistribute group 
resources, thereby posing significant threats to the economic and social status 
of the group. 101 
Similarly, Bobo, together with James R. Kluegel and Ryan A. Smith, argued 
that group position theory can explain the apparent contradiction between 
whites' increasing comfort with blacks, but more negative attitude toward 
social policies intending to improve blacks' status. 102 Applying the group 
position theory to the changed circumstances and differing needs of modem 
racism illustrates the theory's dynamism and adaptability. 103 Thus, whites 
generally discard old style "Jim Crow" racism and embrace "laissez-faire" 
racism (stereotyping, blaming, and resistance to policies aimed at assisting 
blacks) so that the "dominant racial group [can] maintain a privileged status 
relative to members of a subordinate racial group."104 According to these 
approaches, whites' policy preferences are rooted in a belief that their race 
ought to be dominant, rather than on irrational animus toward blacks.105 
96 Lawrence Bobo, Whites' Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group 
Conflict?, 45 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1196, 1197 (1983). 
97 Id. at 1196. 
98 Id. at 1200. 
99 Id. at 1201. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Lawrence Bobo, James R. Kluegel & Ryan A. Smith, Laissez-Faire Racism: The 
Crystallization of a Kinder, Gentler, Antiblack Ideology, in RACIAL ATTITUDES IN THE 
1990's 15, 22 (Steven A. Tuch & Jack K. Martin eds., 1997) (relating modem racist 
attitudes to Blumer's group position theory by characterizing these attitudes as a defensive 
reaction to a perceived threat from blacks). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 22. 
105 Id. at 38 (asserting that attitudes on race are "statements about preferred social 
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C. Striving for Synthesis: Social Dominance Theory 
Social dominance theory, a relatively new concept, also views prejudice and 
discrimination through the lens of group conflict and social hierarchy. 
Although both the realistic-group-conflict and the group position theories focus 
almost exclusively on contests for power or status among dominant and 
subordinate groups, social dominance theory focuses on the individual's 
cognitive function within the context of group rivalries. 106 Associated with the 
work of Professors Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto, social dominance theory is 
an attempt to synthesize a variety of theories concerning prejudice and 
discrimination including social identity, realistic-group-conflict and group 
position.107 Social dominance theory posits a more thoroughly integrated 
theory of prejudice, intergroup relations, and discrimination to explain social 
inequality.108 
Social dominance theory begins with the notion that "all human societies 
tend to be structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies."109 
Membership in certain socially constructed groups, such as racial or ethnic 
groups or groups organized along economic lines, provides group members 
with access to prestige, social power and privilege. 110 According to Sidanius 
and Pratto, group-based social hierarchy refers to the amount of prestige, social 
power and privilege provided to individual group members that cannot be 
understood to flow from any individual's particular merit, talent, achievement 
or ability. 111 Therefore, a group-based social hierarchy is a vehicle for 
ensuring the provision of prestige, social power and privilege, irrespective of 
individual merit. 
How are group-based social hierarchies maintained? Three intertwined 
processes support and maintain group-based social hierarchies: aggregated 
institutional discrimination, aggregated individual discrimination and 
positional relations among racial groups ... not simply or even mainly emotional reactions 
to groups, group symbols, or situations"); Sears, supra note 88, at 24-25 ; see also Lawrence 
Bobo & Vincent L. Hutchings, Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Extending 
Blumer 's Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Context, 61 AMER. Soc. REv. 951 
( 1996) ( examining the effect of perceived threats on race relations). 
106 See Sears, supra note 88, at 25-27. 
107 SJDANIUS & PRA ITO, supra note 45, at 3-31 (surveying major theories of intragroup 
and intergroup relations). 
108 Id. at 3-4; Jim Sidanus & Felicia Pratto, The Inevitability of Oppression and the 
Dynamics of Social Dominance, in PREJUDICE, POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN DILEMMA 173, 
173-74 (Paul M. Sniderman et al. eds., 1993). 
109 SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 45 , at 31 (emphasis omitted). 
11 0 Id. at 32 (contrasting group-based social hierarchy to individual-based social 
hierarchy where individual characteristics, like athletic ability, lead to social power, 
prestige, and privilege, rather than one's ascribed membership in a particular group). 
111 Id. 
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behavioral asymmetry.112 Aggregated individual discrimination includes the 
"simple, daily and sometimes quite inconspicuous individual acts of 
discrimination by one individual against another," which in the aggregate 
eventually construct unequal power relations between social groups. 113 
Similarly, aggregated institutional discrimination refers to the discriminatory 
practices--either intended or unconscious---of important social institutions 
such as the courts and schools, which "result in the disproportionate allocation 
of positive and negative social value across the social status hierarchy."114 
Behavioral asymmetry is the observation that both dominant and subordinate 
groups collude and cooperate to sustain present arrangements. 115 Thus, 
"within relatively stable group-based hierarchies, most of the activities of 
subordinates can be characterized as cooperative of, rather than subversive to, 
the system of group-based domination."116 
Social dominance theory's key insight is its emphasis on the individual-level 
forces that contribute to the perpetuation of group-based social hierarchies. 
Sidanius and Pratto propounded the concept of "social dominance orientation" 
("SDO") or the "value that people place on nonegalitarian and hierarchically 
structured relationships among social groups."117 SDO is an individual-level 
process that measures a particular individual's support for intergroup 
inequality and subordination. 118 As was the case in social identity theory, SDO 
hinges on the importance of self-esteem to the individual's self-concept. Thus, 
Sidanius and Pratto argue that dominant group members can be expected to 
exhibit high levels of SDO because "people's general desire for positive self-
esteem is compatible with hierarchy-legitimizing myths ... making group 
superiority seem appropriate to them." 119 
Focusing on individuals with a high-level of SDO is important because it 
indicates who is likely to discriminate against particular groups. 120 But this 
view is not wholly psychological, and it does not suggest that individuals with 
a propensity for a high-level SDO are somehow aberrant or abnormal. 121 
112 Id. at 39. 
113 Id. at 39-41. 
114 Id. at 41. 
115 Id. at 43-44 (differentiating behavioral asymmetry from earlier structural models that 
failed to recognize "the manner in which subordinates actively participate in and contribute 
to their own subordination"). 
116 Id. 
111 Id.at 61. 
118 SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 45, at 77. 
119 Id. Other factors suggesting high levels of SDO include an individual's background 
and socialization, personality, and gender. See id. at 49; see also Sears, supra note 88, at 26 
("[A]n important individual-level force[] is social dominance orientation, the desire to 
establish and maintain such social inequalities."). 
120 SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 45, at 95. 
121 Id. at 302. 
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Social dominance theory differs from the purely psychological view espoused 
by Gordon Allport, for instance, which saw racial prejudice as fundamentally 
irrational in nature. 122 
Instead, social dominance theory, while predicated on individuals' 
psychological bias, understands psychological bias or SDO from the 
perspective of the human desire to produce group-based social hierarchies. At 
the same time, such psychological biases and group-based social hierarchies 
are seen as mutually self-enforcing. Intergroup discrimination results because 
"individual psychological biases and social context not only [lead] individuals 
to discriminate, but also [facilitate] institutional discrimination."123 
Consequently, social dominance theory provides an integrated theory that 
describes how individual-level psychological processes are related to group-
based hierarchies (i.e., inequality among social groups). 124 As we will see, an 
understanding of these social psychological approaches to intergroup relations 
informs our analysis of affirmative action law. 
II. THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS: INTERGROUP RIVALRY IN ACTION 
Social science research provided us with a basis for looking at whites and 
blacks as rival groups competing for resources. However, we need to go 
further to analyze the process by which those groups compete. This Article 
posits that blacks and whites, competing as groups, seek to attain competitive 
advantage in areas such as housing, education, and employment. Furthermore, 
economically and socially dominant groups may engage in anti-competitive 
conduct to "lock-in" the benefits they have historically enjoyed. Over time, 
122 See ALLPORT, supra note 39, at 27: 
This propensity lies in his normal and natural tendency to form generalizations, 
concepts, categories, whose content represents an oversimplification of his world of 
experience. His rational categories keep close to first-hand experience, but he is able to 
form irrational categories just as readily. In these even a kernel of truth may be 
lacking, for they can be composed wholly of hearsay evidence, emotional protections, 
and fantasy . 
See also THOMAS F. PETTIGREW ET AL. , PREJUDICE 2 (1980) ("Prejudice, then, can be 
thought of as irrationally based, negative attitudes against certain ethnic groups and 
their members." (emphasis in original)). 
123 SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 45, at 304. 
124 Sidanius and Pratto have described the interlocking nature of social dominance theory 
in the following manner: 
Id. 
Once such hierarchically organized systems emerge, the experiences of living in group 
dominance societies . . . and having experiences associated with membership in 
dominant or subordinate groups ... affect people's levels of [SDO] .... The cultural 
ideologies that are part of group dominance societies are so thoroughly learned and so 
widely recognized that it is easy for one person to evoke the ideology in another person 
and so influence that person's behavior to enact that ideology. The discrimination that 
can result helps to re-create the social conditions that are likely to trigger the ideology 
in the future. 
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this has resulted in a social structure that perpetuates benefits unfairly gained. 
By attempting to disrupt those structures, affirmative action programs intend to 
restore a level playing field to the extent possible. 
Several legal scholars have made connections between the anticompetitive 
conduct that is largely condemned in the law of antitrust and social group 
conduct that stifles competition and maintains certain social and economic 
benefits. 125 For example, Robert Cooter has argued that social groups "collude 
to obtain the advantages of monopoly control over markets."126 This critique 
analogized the behavior of discriminating social groups to that of cartels. 127 A 
cartel is an "agreement among otherwise competing firms to reduce their 
output to agreed upon levels, or sell at an agreed upon price."128 A classic 
example of a cartel is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
("OPEC"), which is comprised of a small group of oil producing countries that 
have agreed to limit the amount of petroleum exported, thus maintaining high 
demand and ensuring excess profits. 129 Thus, cartelization is attractive because 
it facilitates the ability of member-firms to earn monopoly profits. 130 The 
cartel model thus demonstrates that discriminatory social groups have an 
incentive to exclude members of other social groups. 131 
The cartel approach reinforces the argument that individuals must be viewed 
as members of groups who desire to further the interests of their 
communities. 132 Like classic business cartels, social group cartels were 
inherently unstable, requiring that ingroup members be sanctioned for 
transgressing group norms and the presence of some formal system of approval 
to prevent collapse. 133 The cartel analogy is an extremely useful foundation for 
directing our thinking about how socially and racially defined groups can 
125 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133 
(1994); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status 
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995); Roithmayr, supra 
note 10, at 734. 
126 Cooter, supra note 125, at 150. 
127 Id. at 153-54. 
128 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND 
ITS PRACTICE 144 (2d ed. 1999). 
129 RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 287 (1984). 
130 HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 144. 
131 Cooter, supra note 125, at 153 ("[A] group with the power to reduce competition 
from others can benefit itself, whether the group is defined by race, religion, gender, or 
industry."). 
132 See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 722 ("Groups exist in a sense that goes beyond 
individuals having similar traits. People act together, in the strong sense of working out 
common goals and then engaging in a cooperative process of trying to achieve them."); see 
also McAdams, supra note 125, at 1007-08 (explaining that discrimination requires sacrifice 
from its members that is often motivated by a member's desire for status within the group). 
133 Cooter, supra note 125, at 153-54. 
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operate to impede competition. 134 
Similarly, Daria Roithmayr showed how an early monopoly of sorts has 
produced a law school admissions scheme that "favors white cultural 
performances and disproportionately excludes people of color."135 Her 
powerful article elucidates how law school admissions standards-largely 
developed in a segregated and non-competitive era-locked-in gains for white 
students. 136 Furthermore, law school admissions standards and their influence 
on the school's prestige operate as a "positive feedback loop," reinforcing and 
strengthening the dominant group's advantage. 137 Roithmayr provides a 
rigorous analysis of this anti-competitive process, and correctly views 
affirmative action as a kind of antitrust remedy. 138 
The works of scholars such as Cooter and Roithmayr lay a solid foundation 
for importing economic concepts to discrimination law, and are important 
additions to our discussion of intergroup competition. 139 As these scholars 
demonstrate, the law of antitrust (and economic concepts more generally) 
provides a rich vocabulary with which to describe anti-competitive actions and 
to analyze the effects of these behaviors. In an effort to create the state of 
"perfect competition," antitrust seeks to prevent firms in a marketplace from 
distorting the competitive process. 140 To prevent distortion, antitrust law has 
134 See also McAdams, supra note 125, at 1007 ("[S]olidarity and loyalty within groups 
lead[s] predictably, if not inevitably, to competition and conflict between groups."). 
135 Roithmayr, supra note 10, at 734. Roithmayr argued that "white cartels excluded 
nonwhites from legal education" as follows: 
First, law schools adopted admissions standards using criteria that excluded people of 
color. Second, legal professionals campaigned to move legal education from 
apprenticeships to the university . . . . Third, leaders of the profession drove out night, 
part-time, and private programs that catered to people of color and immigrants. 
Id. at 758. Roithmayr argues also that law school rankings and standardized admissions 
tests perpetuate this lock-in effect. Id. at 764-66. Roithmayr maintains that the performance 
of minorities does not conform to the standards included in the tests. Id. at 734, National 
rankings, however, award those schools that accept only those students who perform well on 
the standardized tests. Id. at 765. 
136 Id. at 729. 
137 Id. at 732. 
138 Id. at 793-96. 
139 Professor Ian Ayres and Frederic E. Vars have also imported economic theories into 
an analysis of affirmative action. See Ian Ayres & Frederic E. Vars, When Does Private 
Discrimination Justify Public Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1614 (1998). 
Ayres and Vars contend that private discrimination against minorities in business can take 
two forms: upstream or downstream discrimination. Id. Upstream discrimination occurs 
when suppliers charge higher prices or refuse to deal with minority firms. Id. Conversely, 
downstream discrimination exists when buyers offer lower prices or refuse to deal with 
minority firms. Id. Ayres and Vars state that "[e]ither upstream or downstream 
discrimination can reduce the private sales of minority firms and upstream discrimination 
can reduce the sales of minority firms to the government." Id. 
140 JOSEPH E. STJGLITZ, ECONOMICS A 16 (2d ed. 1997) ( defining "perfect competition" as 
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recognized that a variety of techniques can be used to further an oppressive use 
of market power. Antitrust law is primarily concerned with promoting 
allocative efficiency (consumer welfare) and dynamic efficiency (innovation 
and technological change) rather than with ensuring that the interests of all 
market participants are adequately protected at any given time. 141 Antitrust 
law and policy have also recognized that the actions of a particular competitor 
or group of competitors can distort the competitive process, thereby 
undercutting important antitrust goals. 142 A central aim of antitrust law is to 
"prevent economic oppression by maintaining competition."143 This aim is 
important enough to occasionally restrict a firm's liberty to engage in 
particular behavior.144 
The goal of antitrust law is to "maintain public confidence in the market 
mechanism by deterring and punishing instances of economic oppression."145 
Thus, competition among players in those markets must be maintained in order 
to achieve this aim. 146 The goal is to allow market forces to operate freely so 
as to "allocate resources among Americans," 147 but this can only be achieved 
in a regime that values and affirms free competition. 
The emphasis on fair competition is equally important to our analysis of 
black/white intergroup relations. I do not argue that antitrust law should be 
applied to affirmative action cases, nor do I argue that antitrust law is a perfect 
analogy for discrimination cases. What I do argue is that antitrust is explicitly 
concerned with establishing the "rules of the game" in competitive markets, 
and its jurisprudence focuses on analyzing the dynamics of those markets. 
occurring in instances where "each firm is a price taker-it cannot influence the market 
price; at the market price, the firm can sell as much as it wishes, but if it raises its price, it 
loses all sales"). 
141 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN 
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 12-13 (2000); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 
294, 344 (1962) ("It is competition, not competitors, which the [Clayton] Act protects."). In 
Brown Shoe, the Court enjoined a merger between the third and eighth largest sellers of 
shoes in the United States. Id. at 297, 346. The Court concluded that the merger violated § 
7 of the Clayton Act because it would "lessen competition substantially." Id. at 346. 
142 See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 141 , at 14. This is consistent with at least one 
explanation of the origins of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, that is, that it was passed to 
protect small firms against anti-competitive behavior on the part of " large vertically 
integrated firms." HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 50. See generally Thomas J. DiLorenzo, 
The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest Group Perspective, 5 INTER. REV. L. & ECON. 73 
(1985). 
143 SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 141 , at I 0. 
144 See id. at 644-45 (describing remedies in vertical merger enforcement including 
prohibiting mergers and requiring a divestiture); HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 638 
(describing the potential for equitable relief in numerous antitrust contexts). 
145 SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 141 , at 9-10. 
146 Id. at I 0. 
141 Id. 
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This Article is primarily concerned with the ways in which anticompetitive 
conduct can create and perpetuate unfair advantage in the ongoing competitive 
market. The concept of anticompetitive conduct in economics, as shown by 
the scholars mentioned earlier, provides important insights into a discussion of 
affirmative action. Building upon those insights, we can go even further in 
exploring the ways in which blacks and whites engage as groups in a 
competitive process. In particular, blacks and whites compete on a variety of 
different levels and in an interrelated manner. 
A. The Red Group and the Blue Group 
Let us begin our discussion of the process by which groups compete by 
examining a hypothetical game. Suppose that a dominant group (the "red 
group") and a non-dominant group (the "blue group") are competing for the 
same outcome. Success, in this game, is measured by the ability of players to 
secure large financial assets, obtain particular employment opportunities, 
maintain positions of influence in corporate, media and governmental sectors, 
wield political power, and safeguard their homes and environs. 
How would red group members succeed? At a minimum, red group 
members would need to secure access to superior opportunities in at least three 
key areas: neighborhoods, schools, and jobs. Thus, housing, education, and 
employment form an interlocking web of sources of social and economic 
power. 148 For red group members to succeed over time, they need access to 
this trinity of "inputs." Because these three are so inextricably linked, it is 
difficult to discuss each individually. It is useful to explore the linkages 
among them, and to identify the ways in which they mutually reinforce one 
another as sources of competitive advantage. 
Initially, the ability to succeed in our game would require access to 
neighborhoods with low crime rates, good schools, and good jobs. Access to 
such neighborhoods, in turn, would lead to a myriad advantages paying ever-
increasing dividends over time. 149 Neighborhoods with low crime rates allow 
players to concentrate on developing intellectual, cultural, and pecuniary 
capital, instead of dispersing energies on securing personal safety and 
protecting personal property. Such neighborhoods provide access to superior 
educational training, as school enrollment is usually dictated by neighborhood 
148 See john a. powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, 80 MINN: 
L. REv. 749, 758 (1996) (describing the impact of residential segregation which 
concentrates race and poverty and which leads to isolation from the "opportunity structure, 
including education, health care, and jobs, all of which are necessary to succeed in our 
society"). 
149 See generally Xavier de Souza Briggs, Social Capital and Segregation: Race, 
Connections, and Inequality in America, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Working Paper Series RWP02-0l l (February 2002) (examining the "power of 
place to shape lives and life chances"). 
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residence. 150 Thus, the "raw material" of education is supplied through access 
to good neighborhoods. 151 Moreover, neighborhood school funding is often 
tied to the value of the homes in the particular school district, and many 
players are attracted to neighborhoods because of the presence of good 
schools. 152 
Thus, there is a dynamic relationship between school and neighborhood 
quality. Consequently, red group members may lock-in educational benefits in 
one of two ways. They may block blue group members from their 
neighborhoods by employing a "stand and fight" approach, which slows any 
attempt at entry by blue group members. In the alternative, they may relocate 
to other neighborhoods already populated by other red group members, leaving 
blue group members behind. By employing either of these techniques, red 
group members protect property values and ensure wealth accumulation. 153 
The relationship between good schools and good neighborhoods is symbiotic, 
with each enhancing and simultaneously reinforcing the value of the other. 
Education itself is another key component of the interrelated web of social 
and economic well-being. There is a strong correlation between education and 
150 See Molly S. McUsic, The Law 's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promise 
and Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES 
FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 88, 97-99 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999). McUsic 
discusses the disadvantages faced by public schools in low-income residential areas. Id. 
Since most public schools receive a great deal of funding from a local property tax, schools 
in poorer areas are unable to collect as much as schools in wealthy areas. Id. Additionally, 
public schools in low-income areas tend to have more students. Id. Zoning and 
development restrictions in wealthy areas tends to discourage large amounts of residential 
development and, as a result, keep the number of school-aged children down. Id. 
151 See john a. powell, Segregation and Educational Inadequacy in Twin Cities Public 
Schools, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & PoL'Y 337, 339 (1995) ("Public schools in the cities 
quickly became majority-minority and poor; and have been characterized by inferior 
facilities, overcrowded classes, high dropout rates, weak educational outcomes, and 
diminished life opportunities for students."); see also DOUGLAS s. MASSEY & NANCY A. 
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 141-
42 (1993). 
152 Ingrid Gould Ellen, Race-based Neighbourhood Projection: A Proposed Framework 
for Understanding New Data on Racial Integration, 37 URB. STUD. 1513, 1513-14 (2000) 
(arguing that neighborhood entry decisions are based upon expectations about neighborhood 
conditions, including school quality, and that "race is still relevant .. . because rightly or 
wrongly, white households (and some black households as well) tend to associate an 
increasing minority presence in a neighborhood with structural decline"). 
153 MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 147-51 (1995) (indicating that housing in white 
neighborhoods is valued higher and appreciates at a more enhanced rate than housing in 
black neighborhoods); Nancy Denton, The Role of Residential Segregation in Promoting 
and Maintaining Inequality in Wealth and Property, 34 lND. L. REV. 1199, 1205 (2001) 
("Residential segregation limits individual accumulation of human capital via education and 
the job market."). 
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enhanced economic and social outcomes. 154 Superior educational trammg 
allows players to gain entrance to selective colleges and universities, and to 
obtain employment requiring high levels of skill, which in tum generates 
higher incomes. 155 The importance of education cannot be overstated, 
particularly in a twenty-first century economy where the best opportunities 
belong to knowledge workers.156 In such an economy, a strong educational 
background is required for workers seeking to remain competitive for highly-
compensated positions. 157 Indeed, "most of the fastest growing jobs will 
require a college degree." 158 Skills, which are a direct by-product of education, 
are the centerpiece of the new knowledge-based economy.159 Access to 
superior educational opportunities both increases the ability to access 
informational and social networks through which sought-after employment 
opportunities are often advertised, and assures that particular candidates will be 
well-qualified for superior employment positions. 160 
154 Gary Orfield, Schools More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation, 
The Civil Rights Project (July, 2001), at http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/ 
resegregation0 1/schoolsseparate.pdf. ( accessed October 11, 2002) ("[T]he consequences of 
unequal education have become more severe because employment and income are [more] 
sharply linked to education than in the past."); CHRJSTOPHER JENCKS, WHO GETS AHEAD?: 
THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC SUCCESS IN AMERJCA 187-90 (1977). 
155 See Paul William Kingston & John C. Smart, The Economic Pay-Off of Prestigious 
Colleges, in THE HIGH STATUS TRACK: STUDIES OF ELITE SCHOOLS AND STRATIFICATION 147, 
147-74 (Paul William Kingston & Lionel S. Lewis eds., 1990) ("Let us be clear about our 
key finding: graduation from a relatively small set of institutions at the top of the academic 
hierarchy has been distinctly rewarded . .. . "); see also Irene Browne, Cynthia Hewitt, 
Leann Tigges & Gary Green, Why Does Job Segregation Lead to Wage Inequality Among 
African Americans? Person, Place, Sector, or Skills?, 30 Soc. Sci. RES. 473, 492 (2001) 
(articulating the "skills mismatch thesis," and finding that "skills at both the individual and 
the job level .. . underlie the relation between job segregation by race and wages among 
African Americans"). 
156 See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Futurework: Trends and Challenges for Work in the 21st 
Century, 44 OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK Q. 31, 36 (Summer, 2000), at 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ooq/2000/surnmer/art04.htm (accessed October 11, 2002) 
("[O]btaining education, skills training, and occupational information for career 
planning .. . is the key to succeeding in the workforce of the future.") . 
157 Id. at 35. 
158 id. 
159 LESTER C. THuRow, BUILDING WEALTH: THE NEW RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS, 
COMPANIES, AND NATIONS IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 130-31 (1999) (asserting that, 
in the future, knowledge will replace natural resources "as the key ingredient in the third 
industrial revolution"). 
160 Jomills Henry Braddock II & James M. McPartland, How Minorities Continue to be 
Excluded From Equal Employment Opportunity: Research on Labor Market and 
Institutional Barriers, 43 J. Soc. ISSUES 5, 7 (1987) (reporting that, according to a national 
survey or employers, informal recruiting through social contacts is among the most widely-
used method of recruiting employees at all job levels); see Luis M. Falcon & Edwin 
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Access to superior neighborhoods continues to shape future outcomes 
because of the interrelationship among good neighborhoods, good schools, and 
desirable employment. Access to superior neighborhoods grants access to 
good schools, and also grants access to superior employment opportunities that 
might not be available to those living in more distant areas. 161 Access to 
superior neighborhoods also allows for heightened capital accumulation 
because the residential property value in such neighborhoods appreciates.162 
Access to superior employment opportunities allows red group members to 
accumulate financial resources, engage in intergenerational wealth transfers 
that benefit other red group members, influence the political process, and 
otherwise direct the cultural, financial, governmental, and media entities and 
organizations that shape and control society. 
The social psychological and social structural theories described earlier add 
an important layer to this discussion. Red group members may not perceive 
their actions to preserve and protect their advantages as discriminatory. To be 
sure, some red group members may engage in "protective" activities explicitly 
for race-based reasons. But other red group members may not be motivated by 
animus or the desire to harm or discriminate against blue group members. 
Rather, they may simply intend to maintain superior access to social and 
economic opportunities. Whether motivated by animus or not, those actions 
clearly have the effect of locking-out blue group members from the 
competitive process over both the short and long-term. This issue of 
motivation is key to the way we analyze the results. 
Melendez, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Job Searching in Urban Centers, in URBAN 
INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM FOUR CITIES 341, 346-66 (Alice O'Connor et al. eds. , 2001) 
(describing differences in the use of personal networks for job searches across racial and 
ethnic lines). 
161 Here, I allude to the "spatial mismatch hypothesis," which is essentially the notion 
that "involuntary residential segregation of blacks to the inner city, coupled with the 
movement of jobs from central cities to suburbs, has disadvantaged blacks both absolutely 
and relative to whites in metropolitan labor markets." Michael A. Stoll & Steven Raphael, 
Racial Differences in Spatial Job Search Patterns: Exploring the Causes and Consequences, 
76 ECON. GEO. 201, 201 (2000). Recent social science research has supported this 
hypothesis, finding that high levels of residential segregation ensure both that whites and 
minority group members will search for work in different parts of a metropolitan area and 
that minority group members will search for jobs where employment growth is low. Id. at 
202-03; see also SUSAN TuRNER MEIKLEJOHN, WAGES, RACE, SKILLS AND SPACE: LESSONS 
FROM EMPLOYERS IN DETROIT'S AUTO INDUSTRY 51-92 (2000) (arguing that place of 
residence strongly influences work search and employment outcomes); Joleen Kirschenman 
& Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them, But ... ": The Meaning of Race for 
Employers, in RACE AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: CONTENDING VIEWS ON PREJUDICE, 
DISCRIMINATION, AND ETHNOVIOLENCE 115, 115-23 (Fred L. Pincus & Howard J. Ehrlich 
eds., 1994) (asserting that race and inner-city residence are highly correlated and that 
employers often view inner-city residents as undesirable workers). 
162 OLIVER & SHAPIRO,supra note 153, at 147-51; Denton, supra note 153, at 1206-08. 
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B. The Impact of "Barriers to Entry" 
Let us now transition from our hypothetical red and blue groups and move 
toward an examination of intergroup relations in the real world. When 
considering the real world, we need to be aware of the structural mechanisms 
group members use to preserve and protect advantages. If we consider the 
areas of housing, education, and employment as analogous to markets, what 
mechanisms would prevent one group from accessing those markets? The 
economic concept of "barriers to entry" provides interesting insights for 
intergroup competition. 
"Conditions of entry," from an economic perspective, are the structural 
conditions under which competitors enter a given market. 163 They are the 
passageways through which competition between new entrants and incumbents 
occurs. 164 According to economic theory, without entry barriers, a seller's 
potential profits are typically low because other players freely enter the market, 
offer competitive prices, and thus drive prices and profits down for all 
players. 165 From this perspective, a barrier to entry is "some factor in a market 
that permits firms already in the market to earn monopoly profits, while 
deterring outsiders from coming in."166 Thus, a barrier to entry disrupts what 
would be expected to occur if conditions to entry were "free," and allows firms 
to "elevate price above a long-run competitive level." 167 Barriers to entry can 
take a variety of forms including high entry costs, imperfect access to 
information, and government regulation. 168 This Article will argue that 
intergroup discrimination also belongs among the list of barriers to entry. 
The risk and size of the investment needed to enter a particular market is 
one kind of barrier to entry. Prospective market entrants assess the level of 
financial risk required to enter that market. This assessment differs from one 
that solely looks at the expense of entering in a new market-which, in itself, 
may or may not act as a barrier to entry. Rather, markets that require large 
entry costs that cannot be recouped pose significant risk and, therefore, can act 
as barriers to entry for new market participants. For example, if a prospective 
market entrant must spend a high fixed amount on a generic warehouse and 
163 JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES 
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 3 (1956). 
164 Id. ("Let us understand the term 'condition of entry' to an industry to mean something 
equivalent to the 'state of potential competition' from possible new sellers."). 
165 Id. (explaining, alternatively, that barriers to entry permit firms to elevate prices over 
time and that entry will hinder prices only when prices exceed a "super-competitive level"). 
166 HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 39. 
167 BAIN, supra note 163, at 17. Throughout this discussion, I use the more liberal 
"Bainian" definition of entry barriers which "treats as a barrier any factor that as a realistic 
matter discouraged entry," as opposed to the more narrow definition favored by G.J. Stigler. 
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 141, at 65 (limiting barriers to entry to just those costs 
forced upon new entrants that were not forced upon incumbent firms). 
168 STIGLITZ, supra note 140, at 349-53. 
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delivery trucks to enter a particular market, the financial risk is not that 
significant. 169 If the business fails, the player can probably liquidate these 
common and salable assets readily and make back most of her investment. 170 
However, if the prospective market entrant must build a highly specialized 
processing plant that can be used only for one purpose, the financial risk is 
significant. 171 If the business fails, the cost of building this plant is a "sunk 
cost," which the player will not be able to recover. 172 Thus, the prospect of 
losing a sunk cost makes this market less attractive for new entrants. 
There are interesting analogies that can be explored when viewing 
discrimination as a barrier to entry into the markets for education, housing and 
employment. Assume that a law school education at an exclusive private 
school currently costs approximately $90,000. 173 Consider, then, a black 
student assessing her prospects in the legal job market. If our student believes 
that she can get a job and perhaps become a partner at a high-paying firm, 
there is no significant barrier to entry because she will earn enough money to 
recoup her initial investment. However, employment discrimination, whether 
real or perceived, may act as a barrier to entry. Our student might look at the 
legal market and understand that there is a possibility that her investment in 
education will be a sunk cost. Because of discrimination, there is less of a 
chance that our student will get a well-paying, big-firm job, and discrimination 
may reduce her chances of advancing within firms and being as financially 
successful as her white male counterparts. 174 Thus, employment 
discrimination, or the perception of employment discrimination, may act as a 
barrier to entry in some fields in which the cost of entering the market, and the 
risk inherent in that cost, are high. 175 
169 HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 528 (explaining that if, in order to enter a market, a 
firm must invest in things that are generally useful, the costs of which would be recoupable 
upon failure of the business, the prospective market entrant's risk is low and entry into the 
market is likely). 
110 Id. 
m Id. 
m Id. 
173 See Jerry Jastrab, Tuition Here is Still a Bargain, N.J. LAW., Aug. 20, 2001 , at I, 
LEXIS, News & Business, NJLAWR File (comparing New Jersey state law school tuition 
with top tier law school tuition at Columbia, Harvard, and Yale). 
174 Alan Jenkins, Losing the Race, AM. LAW., Oct. 4, 2001, at 90-92 (reporting a "virtual 
l 00 percent turnover of African-American associates" at a major law firm that had once 
employed black lawyers in relatively high numbers). Jenkins indicates that the reasons for 
the slow progress of African Americans in law firms included "race-related barriers to 
obtaining challenging work," lack of direct client contact, and inadequate mentoring. Id. at 
92. 
175 The Supreme Court has recognized the pernicious effect of barriers to entry in the 
context of disparate impact theory. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 
(1971) ("[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment 
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups 
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The housing market provides a similar example of the effects of 
discrimination. A prospective black homebuyer sizes up the housing market, 
and sees that he must spend $300,000 to purchase a home in a nice 
neighborhood with good schools and low crime rates. Under normal 
circumstances, our home buyer could assume that the value of his house would 
appreciate over time. 176 Thus, assuming he could get a home loan, there would 
be no particular barrier to his entry to his preferred neighborhood. Assume, 
however, that our homebuyer's move to the .area might begin a cycle of 
neighborhood transition, and white families deserted the area as more black 
families moved in.177 As a result, the value of our homebuyer's home might 
fail to appreciate---or might even depreciate-in value. 178 Here, the mere 
potential for race-based results injects risk into the prospective homebuyer's 
investment and might deter the family's entry into the market. 
Next, advertising and promotion can also act as a barrier to entry in a 
marketplace. 179 The effects of advertising can be cumulative, resulting in high 
levels of customer loyalty to brands over time. Thus, "established firms may 
have a distinct advantage over new entrants."18° Furthermore, advertising may 
create brand loyalty, thus increasing barriers to entry. 181 When brand loyalty 
and are unrelated to measuring job capability."). However, the term "barrier" in disparate 
impact theory is typically used to describe static, easily identifiable and eradicable structures 
rather than to describe the role of anti-competitive conduct in erecting and maintaining a 
variety of barriers to entry. The antitrust thematic vocabulary thus takes us beyond the 
disparate impact conception of barriers by helping us to understand the underlying group 
conduct driving the erection and maintenance of ongoing barriers to entry in the market. 
176 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 153, at 108-09 (noting that value of an average 
residential property tripled from 1970 to 1980, providing homeowners a significant 
opportunity to accumulate wealth through home equity). 
177 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1965, 1985-88 (2000). Bell and Parchomovosky describe "Schelling's tipping model." Id. 
at 1985 (crediting the model to Thomas C. Schelling). Schelling's tipping model presumes 
that white residents have varying levels of racial tolerance. Id. Thus, when the first black 
person enters a neighborhood, only the most intolerant whites depart. Id. Then, those 
vacancies are filled by more blacks causing those whites that are only marginally tolerant to 
leave. Id. at 1985-86. This phenomenon repeats creating a tipping effect that drives more 
and more whites out of the neighborhood. Id. 
178 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 153, at 147 ("[W]hites pay a premium to live in 
homogeneous neighborhoods, but their property appreciates at an enhanced rate. While this 
may mean that blacks find relative housing 'bargains' in segregated communities, their 
property does not appreciate as much."). 
179 HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 529. 
180 Id. Hovenkamp explains that if marketing has a "cumulative effect," then the firm 
that has been advertising in the market for a long period will have a distinct advantage over 
the newcomer. Id. Furthermore, advertising is an example of sunk cost because it is not 
recoverable if the firm fails. Id. 
181 ROBERT E. MCAULIFFE, ADVERTISING, COMPETITION & PUBLIC POLICY: THEORIES AND 
NEW EVIDENCE 7 (I 987). 
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exists, "an entering firm must overcome the preference consumers have for 
established brands."182 For example, "Disney has become synonymous in 
consumers' minds with good, clean family entertainment. 183 Over time, 
consumers have developed brand loyalty to Disney products and services, 
because Disney has consistently promoted and delivered a certain image. 184 
This brand loyalty saves consumers from expending energy and resources in 
researching a new brand, because they know they can safely choose a product 
from Disney. 185 This strong brand loyalty can act as a barrier to entry for a 
newer entrant into the market. For example, if a new competitor wanted to 
launch a product competitive to a Disney product, it would have to spend 
significant resources in marketing and promoting that product. 186 
Now let us imagine a top university or professional school as a similar 
"brand," such as the "brand" of Harvard, Yale, or Brown. Over time, these 
universities have consistently promoted and delivered a certain product: 
highly-educated, desirable entrants into the work force. 187 If we consider 
employers as the consumers of this "product," we begin to see how brand 
loyalty acts in this context. Top employers know they can safely choose an 
employee from a brand-name university. Over time, employers develop strong 
brand loyalty, so that they favor recruits from a select number of universities 
and graduate schools. 188 Similarly, decision-makers in corporations can be 
seen as exhibiting brand loyalty when they purchase other knowledge-based 
products and services. If a CEO of a corporation requires the services of a 
182 McAuliffe explains that overcoming a competitor's brand loyalty may require a new 
entrant to advertise more than incumbent firms or offer lower prices, both of which reduce 
potential profits. id. 
183 Chiranjeev Kohli & Lance Leuthesser, Brand Equity: Capitalizing on intellectual 
Capital, IVEY Bus. J., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 75, 79 ("Powerful brands, like Coca-cola and 
Disney, have developed countless opportunities to extend the brand to products and places 
that fit the family, fun, wholesome and nostalgic values these brands symbolize."); see 
Kevin Lane Keller, Building Consumer-Based Brand Equity, MARKETING MGMT., July-Aug. 
2001, at 15. 
184 See, e.g., Disney Interactive, Into Networks to Launch Disney interactive Channel 
Over Broadband, Bus. WIRE, June 19, 2000, LEXIS, News & Business, BWIRE File; Dave 
McNary, Embattled Disney Finds Core Strength, DAILY NEWS L.A., Oct. 18, 1999, LEXIS, 
News & Business, LAD File (reporting on Walt Disney Co. ' s poor stock performance 
despite the considerable strength of Disney's brand loyalty). 
185 See Jaishankar Ganesh, Mark J. Arnold, & Kristy E. Reynolds, Understanding the 
Customer Base of Service Providers: An Examination of the Differences Between Switchers 
and Stayers, 64 J. MARKETING 65, 69 (2000). 
186 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 529-30; MCAULIFFE, supra note 181, at 7. 
187 See Della Bradshaw, Survey-Business Education 2000, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 
24, 2000, at 1. 
188 Paul William Kingston & James G. Clawson, Getting on the Fast Track: Recruitment 
at an Elite Business School, in THE HIGH STATUS TRACK: STUDIES OF ELITE SCHOOLS AND 
STRATIFICATION 231, 244-49 (Paul William Kingston & Lionel S. Lewis eds., 1990). 
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management consulting firm, he may exhibit brand loyalty to McKinsey, 
because the "brand" of McKinsey stands for a particular level of quality and 
attributes. 189 
At this point, one might ask what is wrong with brand loyalty, if the product 
or service delivers what it stands for. The aim is not to show that there is 
something necessarily wrong with this shorthand decision-making process. 
This analogy merely shows how brand loyalty can establish barriers to entry 
for minority group members. If well-established brands through which 
important business, governmental, and legal transactions take place are 
controlled by white individuals, whiteness itself becomes synonymous with the 
strength of those brands, further serving to enhance the prestige associated 
with being white. The simultaneous power-strengthening nature of this 
relationship is similar to the "positive feedback loop" identified by Daria 
Roithmayr in the context of law school admissions. 190 This does not mean as a 
theoretical matter that black individuals cannot break into these elite schools or 
employers; in fact, many have done just that. 191 It does mean, however, that as 
a structural issue, brand loyalty to these elite institutions can act as a 
systematic bar to minority advancement. 
Finally, government regulations and licensing requirements can also create 
barriers to entry. 192 The classic example is a regulatory monopoly, in which 
the government licenses a limited number of players to provide a good or 
service, such as electricity or gas. Such regulation creates a barrier to entry 
because it would be difficult-if not impossible-for a new player to enter this 
market. 193 Extensive regulation and licensing requirements short of monopoly 
creation can also create barriers to entry by raising the cost of doing business, 
particularly for small firms. 194 The paradigmatic example, of course, is the 
prior system of state-mandated segregation, which functioned to create a clear 
barrier to entry to minority competitors and still has ramifications for 
competition in employment today. I argue that this barrier to entry, which can 
be seen in many areas, has functioned overtime to allow whites to secure unfair 
advantages which they still enjoy today. Affirmative action programs can be 
understood in many cases as an attempt to disrupt that cycle, allowing for fair 
competition for access to benefits. The next part will examine these dynamics 
in three different markets- housing, education, and employment. 
189 See David Haigh, Making Your Mark, ACCOUNTANCY, May 3, 2000, at 30; John A. 
Byrne, The McKinsey Mystique, Bus . WK., Sept. 20, 1993, at 66, LEXIS, News & Business, 
MWP File (analyzing brand marketing of the "Big Five" accounting firms) . 
190 Roithmayr, supra note 10, at 754. 
191 See, e.g. , Jenkins, supra note 174, at 90 (discussing one major firm ' s effort to hire 
black attorneys). 
192 HOVENKAMP, supra note 128, at 530. 
193 Id. at 530-31. 
194 Id. 
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Ill. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS UNDERLYING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES: 
EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION, AND HOUSING 
We now examine three recent cases that illustrate the competitive dynamics 
discussed above. These three cases are important on a deeper level because 
they represent an effort on the part of government to ameliorate or guard 
against discrimination in three vitally important areas of our society: 
employment, education and housing. That government has intervened ( or has 
been forced to intervene) in these cases is no accident. Employment, education 
and housing form an interlocking web of sources of social and economic 
power. 
If we look closely at the nature and history of the dispute in each case, we 
see a core struggle among socially and racially defined groups for economic 
resources, educational advantages, and beneficial employment opportunities. 
Each translates into status and power. These cases can also be viewed as 
demonstrations of intergroup conflict, and of government's attempt to mediate 
contests for social and economic benefits among groups with conflicting, often 
incompatible, agendas. Thus, these cases also illustrate the ways in which 
groups compete in the real world for social and economic benefits. 
Furthermore, the cases demonstrate some of the techniques used by group 
members to secure and maintain competitive advantage in particular contests. 
Unfortunately, the courts evaluating these cases have ignored these 
underlying realities. This is consistent with the notion that courts as 
adjudicative bodies are ill-equipped to deal with societal discrimination; thus, 
the courts' focus on specific instances of identified discrimination and 
insistence on particularized proof in affirmative action cases. 195 The difficulty, 
however, is that these determinations have prevented other governmental 
actors from implementing affirmative action plans which seek to level the 
playing field so that members of these racially and socially defined groups can 
compete on a more equal footing. 
195See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 
297, 320 (1997): 
It is an axiom of modern constitutional scholarship that, when reviewing the actions of 
the democratically selected branches, the courts are better suited to evaluation of the 
means by which governments accomplish their purposes than the ends they choose to 
pursue. Gerald Gunther articulated this position twenty-five years ago, and other 
scholars have made similar arguments. Indeed, this impulse appears to underlie much 
of the modern criticism of judicial "balancing." The reasoning underlying this 
conclusion is quite simple, and is tied to Alexander Bickel's concept of the "counter-
majoritarian difficulty." Simply put, the idea is that in a democracy, the choice of what 
ends government should pursue, and the evaluation of the importance of those ends, 
should be exercised by elected representatives. 
(internal citations omitted); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 16 (1962); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 1-9 (1980); David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government 
Interests: Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REv. 1521, 
1525-28 ( 1992). 
2002] INTERGROUP RIVALRY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 1123 
This conundrum brings into stark relief an und~rlying problem presented by 
the current direction of affirmative action doctrine: courts' institutional 
constraints should not be made to constrain other governmental actors. That is, 
just because courts may be ill-equipped to deal with more wide-spread 
discrimination occurring between socially and racially defined groups within 
our society, it does not follow that Congress or some other governmental actor 
should be foreclosed from formulating a policy that promotes fair competition 
among rival groups. 
Each of these cases illustrates the Court's traditional approach to equal 
protection, in which it adheres to the individualist discriminatory framework as 
key to finding a violation. As noted earlier, this approach has reached its apex 
in the Court's affirmative action doctrine, which protects the rights of 
individuals in a way that trumps the interests of blacks and other minority 
group members. 196 Our current equal protection doctrine treats all racial 
classifications, whether benign or invidious, as equally suspect. 197 Thus, strict 
scrutiny will be applied to affirmative action programs challenged under equal 
protection principles. 198 
Strict scrutiny, when applied in the affirmative action context, requires that 
the governmental actor demonstrate that its affirmative action program is 
justified by a compelling governmental interest, and that the program is 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 199 There are two potential compelling 
interests to which governments can point in justifying affirmative action 
programs. The first is diversity. Diversity was first offered as a "substantial" 
state interest in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.200 In Bakke, 
the plurality of the Court invalidated an affirmative action program at the 
Medical School of the University of California at Davis.201 Justice Powell 
provided the swing vote and in his opinion noted that fostering diversity in 
academia was "clearly a constitutionally permissible goal."202 Nevertheless, 
Powell concluded that the strict quota system employed in the program at 
issue, was an impermissible means in attaining this goal.2°3 This portion of 
196 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) [hereinafter 
Adarand III] (stressing that the Equal Protection Clause protects groups and any 
governmental action that uses race classifications will be "subjected to detailed judicial 
scrutiny" to ensure that the action does not harm individuals). 
197 See id. at 226 (rejecting "the surface appeal of holding 'benign' classifications to a 
lower standard [ of scrutiny]"). 
198 See id. at 227 (holding that all racial classifications, however benign, must be judged 
with strict scrutiny); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) 
(asserting that strict scrutiny is necessary to "'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race"). 
199 See Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 227. 
200 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978). 
201 Id. at 319-20. 
202 Id. at 311-12. 
203 Id. at 314-15. 
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Powell's opinion, however, garnered no support from the other members of the 
Court,204 and since Bakke it is not at all clear that diversity still forms the basis 
of a compelling government interest. 205 
The second and more promising candidate is the government's desire to 
alleviate the present effects of either present or past discriminatory conduct.206 
The problem is that while the "present effects" interest is still technically valid, 
the government will usually encounter significant proof hurdles in its effort to 
make such a showing because the governmental actor usually cannot show that 
it is responsible for whatever yawning chasm it seeks to rectify by virtue of the 
affirmative action plan.207 Similarly, notwithstanding the fact that the 
government may attempt to justify its affirmative action plan by pointing to 
private discriminatory conduct that it has aided and abetted and which 
continues to disable minority group members, again the proof problems remain 
significant (although perhaps not insurmountable).208 
Moreover, even if the government can convince the court that its affirmative 
action plan ameliorates the present effects of past discriminatory conduct, it 
204 Id. at 269-72 (describing the disposition of the Court). 
205 The Sixth Circuit recently confronted the constitutionality of an affirmative action 
program at the University of Michigan Law School. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 
(6th Cir. 2002). The plan conformed to Justice Powell 's suggestion in Bakke by considering 
race as a "plus" factor in determining admission to the law school. Id. at 746. Citing Bakke, 
the court held that student body diversity is a compelling state interest. Id. at 744 (finding 
also that the plan, as designed, was narrowly-tailored to achieve that purpose). Even 
bolstered by the Sixth Circuit's opinion, however, diversity is unlikely to achieve much 
support from the Court outside the area of education. 
206 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499, 511 (1989) 
(invalidating a plan designed to aid minority-owned contractors because it was not designed 
to remedy specific instances of discrimination in the industry); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of 
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (striking down a union contract that limited minority 
layoffs because the city could show no instances of prior discrimination by the 
governmental unit involved); see also Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 273-74 (5th Cir. 
2000) [hereinafter "Hopwood 1/1'1 (stating that the government may "use racial preferences 
under particular circumstances to remedy the effects of past discrimination"). 
207 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 953-54 (5th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter 
Hopwood II]. The panel in Hopwood II invalidated an affirmative action program at the 
University of Texas because there was no specific evidence that the university had engaged 
in past discrimination. Id. at 954. The court held that evidence of discrimination in Texas 
schools dating back to the parents and grandparents of today's students was insufficient. Id. 
at 953-54. 
208 See Ayres & Vars, supra note 139, at 1611-12. Ayres and Vars suggest that the 
Supreme Court has recognized a valid state interest in remedying private discrimination. Id. 
at 161 I. In Croson, Justice O'Connor wrote, "It would seem equally clear, however, that [a 
state] has the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own 
legislative jurisdiction." 488 U.S. at 491-92. Accordingly, Ayres and Vars read Croson as 
requiring that affmnative action merely be limited to the market-public or private-in 
which past discrimination occurred. See Ayres & Vars, supra note 139, at 1612-13. 
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will likely falter at the second step of the strict scrutiny test, narrow tailoring. 
The government will often be required to show that there is no less restrictive 
alternative than the one used. 209 The determination to apply strict scrutiny to 
affirmative action programs, Justice O'Connor's admonitions 
notwithstanding,210 usually ends in the predictable determination that such 
programs are unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection law. 
Given this, "classic" affirmative action programs, such as where minority 
students are admitted to a state school using a separate and arguably lower 
admission standard, have recently been struck down in the federal courts.211 
Less visible, however, is the fact that courts are also deciding cases that do not 
involve the kind of preferences normally associated with affirmative action 
programs in the classic sense. Nevertheless, these courts are striking the 
challenged programs down as analogous to disfavored affirmative action plans 
and therefore violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, of four recent 
federal appellate cases dealing with affirmative action and affirmative action-
like programs, in only one did the court uphold the program at issue- and, 
ironically, that was the one case that involved a "true" affirmative action 
program. The other cases, as I will discuss in some detail, did not involve the 
kind of preference we normally associate with a classic affirmative action 
program, but the courts in those cases struck down the programs anyway. 
The following is an outline of the courts' approaches in the three 
affirmative action-like cases, MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Association v. Federal 
Communications Commission,212 Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public 
Schools,213 and Walker v. City of Mesquite.214 The fundamental problem with 
the courts' analysis in those cases was the failure to fully and adequately 
consider the nature and scope of the compelling governmental interest that the 
government had advanced to justify the "affirmative action-like" program at 
issue. As a result, the government faces the added difficulty of demonstrating 
that it ( or a private entity that it has aided or abetted) is responsible for the 
disparity which the affirmative action program seeks to rectify. The courts' 
failure to adequately consider the nature of the compelling interest at stake 
magnifies the proof problem that the government will encounter as it attempts 
to justify why it has taken race-conscious action in a particular circumstance. 
209 See Adarand Ill, 515 U.S. at 229, 237-38. 
210 See id. at 23 7 ( attempting to dispel the belief that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, 
fatal in fact"). 
211 See, e.g., Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 953-54 (invalidating an affirmative action program 
at the University of Texas). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 752 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(upholding the constitutionality of a University of Michigan affirmative action program). 
212 236 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
213 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999). 
214 169 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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A. Competition in Employment: MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Association v. 
Federal Communications Commission 
Because the case concerns access to employment, competitive dynamics are 
at the heart of MD/DC/DE Broadcasters in a very fundamental way. 
Broadcast licensees, who are regulated by the Federal Communications 
Commission ("FCC"), historically hired primarily white candidates for 
employment. Insiders, who were white (and generally, men), controlled access 
to these jobs by controlling the flow of information about job openings. Over 
time, this control resulted in a structure that favored white applicants at the 
expense of black applicants (and other minority group members). The FCC's 
attempt to disrupt this system, and the courts' shortsighted analysis of the 
FCC's attempts, are the focus ofmy discussion. 
In MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, fifty broadcasters argued that an FCC Equal 
Employment Opportunity ("EEO") rule requiring licensees to engage in "broad 
outreach" in employment recruiting efforts violated equal protection principles 
because it granted a preference to women and minorities.215 The D.C. Circuit 
held the FCC's EEO rule unconstitutional because it "put official pressure 
upon broadcasters to recruit minority candidates."2 16 In order to place this 
decision in its proper context, some background on the origin of the EEO rule 
and the prior challenges to it is necessary. 
1. Origins of the FCC's EEO "Broad Outreach" Rules 
The FCC licenses broadcasters, and regulates certain aspects of its licensees ' 
businesses.217 Since broadcasters benefit from a license to use the broadcast 
spectrum-considered to be owned by the public-the FCC requires 
broadcasters to further the public interest.21 8 Dating back to the late 1960' s, 
the FCC determined that "discriminatory employment practices by a broadcast 
licensee are incompatible with operation of the public interest."219 Yet, at the 
same time, the FCC expressed concern that simply prohibiting overt 
discrimination was not sufficient to ensure equal employment opportunity at 
broadcast stations.220 Thus, there was a need for a regulatory solution that 
recognized that "schools, training institutions, recruitment and referral sources 
215 236 F.3d at 15. 
21 6 Id. 
2 17 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (establishing the FCC and charging it with 
regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communications by wire and radio). 
2 18 Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination 
in Their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766, 768-69 (11 7-9) (1968) (memorandum 
opinion and order) (asserting that the FCC may only grant broadcast authorization if it 
serves the public' s best interests). 
2 19 Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination 
in Their Employment Practices, 18 F.C.C.2d 240, 240 (1 1) (1969) (report and order) 
(adopting a nondiscrimination rule). 
220 Id. at 242-43 (1 5). 
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follow[ed] the pattern set by industry," and that such sources did "not normally 
supply job applicants regardless of race, color, religion or national origin 
unless asked to do so by employers."221 Consequently, in 1970, the FCC 
promulgated equal opportunity regulations that prohibited broadcast licensees 
from engaging in invidious discrimination and required licensees to adopt 
affirmative action programs intended to ensure equal employment 
opportunities for women and minorities within each licensee's labor 
hierarchy.222 Over time, the FCC enhanced the importance of recruitment to 
licensees' affirmative action programs, and required "broad outreach" to attract 
qualified women and minorities.223 The FCC then promulgated regulations 
that required licensees to "seek out sources likely to refer female and minority 
applicants for employment, to track the source of each referral, and to record 
the race and sex of each applicant and of each person hired. "224 The FCC 
would then take into account data revealing an under-representation of women 
and minorities in the licensee's labor hierarchy (as compared to the local 
workforce) when considering whether to renew the broadcaster's license.225 
2. Challenging the FCC's "Broad Outreach" Rules: Lutheran Church 
Missouri Synod v. Federal Communications Commission 
In 1998, an FCC licensee challenged these regulations in Lutheran Church-
Missouri Synod v. F. C. C. 226 In Lutheran Church, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia ruled that the FCC's EEO rules violated equal protection 
principles.227 This was because, although the EEO rules required race-
conscious outreach and reporting as opposed to race-conscious hiring, an 
"underrepresentation" of minority group members within a licensee's labor 
hierarchy could trigger "intense EEO review."228 Consequently, the D.C. 
221 Id. at 243 (1 5) (quoting COMM. FOR Gov'T CONTRACTS, PATTERN FOR PROGRESS 14 
(1960)). 
222 Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination 
in their Employment Practices, 23 F.C.C.2d 430, 430-31 (fl 1-2) (1970) (report and order). 
223 Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Equal Employment 
Opportunity in the Broadcast Radio and Television Services, 4 F.C.C.R. 1715, 1715-16 (11 
5-14) (1989) (memorandum opinion and order); Review of the Commission's Broadcast and 
Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rules and Policies and Termination of the EEO 
Streamlining Proceeding, 15 F.C.C.R. 2329, 2377 (1 115) (2000) [hereinafter Report & 
Order] (describing the EEO's goal of attaining "broad outreach" to all segments of society). 
224 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. F.C.C., 236 F.3d 13, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
22s Id. 
226 141 F.3d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
227 Id. at 349-55. But see Michelle Adams, The Last Wave of Affirmative Action, 1998 
WIS. L. REV. 1395, 1447-50 (arguing that Lutheran Church was wrongly decided because 
the EEO rule at issue was not a "preference" for the purpose of triggering strict scrutiny 
review). 
228 Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 353. The FCC's EEO rules with respect to women 
were not challenged in the case. Id. at 351 n.9. 
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Circuit ruled that the EEO rules requiring broad outreach in recruitment 
pressured licensees to hire minorities so as to avoid the specter of a 
"governmental audit."229 The problem from the court's perspective was that 
the EEO regulations "certainly influence ultimate hiring decisions. "230 Thus, 
the court characterized the EEO rule as a racial classification and applied strict 
scrutiny review.231 Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the FCC's interest in 
fostering diverse programming was not sufficiently compelling to support the 
EEO rules, and that the rules were not narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest. 232 
3. The FCC's Revised Outreach Efforts 
In 2000, as a consequence of the Lutheran Church ruling, the FCC adopted 
a new EEO rule that attempted to balance the desire for effective and 
meaningful recruitment of minorities and women with the constraints imposed 
by the court in Lutheran Church.233 In adopting this new rule, the FCC 
concluded that "the record before us confirms our view that broad outreach 
efforts to ensure that all segments of the population, including minorities and 
women, are aware of broadcast employment opportunities are of crucial 
importance to the goals established by Congress of deterring unlawful 
discrimination and fostering diversity of programming. "234 The new rule 
required licensees to widely disseminate information about employment 
opportunities.235 Licensees were provided with two options; selection of either 
would satisfy the licensees' obligations under the new rule.236 Option A was 
titled the "Supplemental Recruitment Program."237 Under Option A, a licensee 
employing more than ten employees was required to engage in at least four 
approved recruitment initiatives over a two-year period, including participation 
in a job fair, co-sponsoring a job fair with women and minority groups in the 
business and professional community, participation in a broadcast scholarship 
program, or creating a broadcast internship program.238 Option A did not 
require the licensee to report the race and sex of job applicants or interviewees 
to the FCC. 239 
Option B, the "Alternative Recruitment Program," provided the licensee 
229 Id. at 353-54. 
230 Id. at 351. 
231 Id. at 354. 
232 Id. at 354-56. 
233 Report & Order, supra note 223, at 2330-31 (i/ l) 
234 Id. at 2366 (ii 79). 
235 Id. at 2332-33 (i/ 7). 
236 Id. at 2354-65 (ii 78). 
231 Id. 
238 Id. ; see MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass 'n v. F.C.C., 236 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(providing complete list of qualifying recruitment initiatives). 
239 See MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 17. 
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with discretion to design its own outreach program. 240 Such discretion was 
conditioned on the licensee's ability to "demonstrate that it is widely 
disseminating information concerning job vacancies by analyzing the 
recruitment sources, race, ethnicity and gender of the applicants by its 
recruitment efforts."241 Licensees selecting Option B were required to report 
annually the recruitment source, race, and gender of each job applicant. 242 A 
licensee could be required to modify its outreach program to enhance its 
inclusiveness where the "data collected does not confirm that notifications are 
reaching the entire community."243 The FCC emphasized that, in monitoring 
the applicant pool data, there would be no requirement of proportionality.244 
Finally, all licensees were also required to file an Annual Employment 
Report that disclosed the race and sex of each of its employees.245 In contrast 
to the EEO rule challenged in Lutheran Church, however, information about 
the race and gender of licensees' employees would be used "only to monitor 
industry trends and not to screen renewal applications or to assess compliance 
with its EEO obligations."246 
4. Another Challenge to "Broad Outreach": MD/DC/DE Broadcasters v. 
FCC 
In 2001, in MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, for the second time in less than three 
years, the D.C. Circuit held the FCC's EEO rule unconstitutional.247 But 
where the constitutional infirmity in Lutheran Church centered on the rule's 
pressure on broadcasters "to grant some degree of preference to minorities in 
hiring,"248 in MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, the rule impermissibly pressured 
stations to recruit minorities and women. 249 
In reaching its conclusion, the court viewed Option A and Option B very 
differently. Option A, standing alone, was constitutionally sound because 
licensees were free to choose outreach and recruitment measures that did not 
240 Report & Order, supra note 233, at 2375 ('If 104) (purportedly addressing 
broadcasters that requested more flexibility in designing outreach programs). 
241 Id. at 2365 ('If 78). 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 2375 ('If 104). 
244 Id. at 2378-79 ('If 120) (maintaining that, although the numbers of minorities and 
women in the applicant pools need not be proportionate to the that of the work force, "few 
or no females or minorities in a broadcaster's applicant pools may be one indication (and 
only one indication) that the station's outreach efforts are not reaching the entire 
community"). 
245 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. F.C.C., 236 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
246 Report & Order, supra note 233, at 2332 ('If 6). 
247 236 F.3d at 15-16. 
248 Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. F.C.C., 141 F.3d 344, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(emphasis added). 
249 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 18-19. 
1130 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1089 
"place a special emphasis upon the presence of women and minorities in the 
target audience. "250 Thus, under Option A, there was no "pressure" on 
broadcasters to recruit women or minorities.251 However, the court held that 
Option B "create[ d] pressure to focus recruiting efforts upon women and 
minorities in order to induce more applications from those groups."252 The 
court said that Option B created "pressure" because the FCC investigated 
Option B licensees who reported receiving few applications from women or 
minority group members.253 From the court's perspective, the credible threat 
of agency investigation formed a powerful inducement to conform to FCC 
commands.254 Indeed, the court went one step further, suggesting that the real 
reason for the agency's focus on the race and gender of job applicants was the 
FCC's interest in particular employment outcomes, rather than in ensuring that 
the appropriate recruitment and outreach efforts were undertaken.255 
The D.C. Circuit interpreted Supreme Court precedent as requiring courts to 
apply strict scrutiny to any "racial classification" (e.g., racially-targeted 
recruitment) that could be understood as treating the races unequally.256 Did 
Option B subject the races to "unequal treatment?" The D.C. Circuit held that 
it did because the FCC rule required licensees to use limited recruiting 
resources to attract additional minority candidates.257 This requirement created 
an inequality because white male candidates-who, presumably, would have 
otherwise learned of employment opportunities-would be precluded from 
learning of those opportunities as a result of the EEO rule.258 Thus, the 
Commission's directive would deprive white male candidates of an 
"opportunity to compete simply because of their race."259 Consequently, the 
250 Id. at 19. 
251 Id. at 18-19. 
252 Id. at 19. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. ("Were ['broad outreach'] the Commission's only goal, then it would scrutinize 
the licensee's outreach efforts, not the job applications those efforts generate."). 
256 Id. at 20. While the broadcasters did argue that the FCC's EEO rule violated the 
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because it 
granted a preference to women, the court did not rule conclusively on the question of the 
rule's constitutionality as applied to gender preferences. Instead, the court stated that while 
the EEO rule granted a "preference" to women candidates, the application of intermediate 
scrutiny in this instance might allow the rule to "survive where the same regulation fails 
with respect to minorities." Id. at 23 . The court struck down the rule in its entirety, 
however, on the theory that removing all references to minorities, while leaving the 
regulation intact with respect to women would "severely distort the Commission's program 
and produce a rule strikingly different from any the Commission has ever considered." Id. 
257 Id. at 20-21 
258 Id. at 21. 
259 Id. 
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court applied strict scrutiny just as it had in Lutheran Church.260 
As discussed below in more detail,261 the court did not perform a full-blown 
compelling governmental interest analysis. The FCC had argued that the EEO 
rule was supported by its interest in remedying the effects of past 
discrimination and in preventing discrimination from occurring in the future.262 
The court gave short-shift to that argument, first stating that "the 
Government's remedial interest is compelling only with respect to 'identified 
discrimination,"' then noting that it need not reach the issue at all because the 
EEO rule was not narrowly tailored to achieve the interests asserted.263 
The Court replayed this "identified discrimination" theme in its narrow 
tailoring analysis. The difficulty was that the EEO rule was not premised on a 
"predicate finding" that any specific broadcaster had discriminated in the past 
or would do so in the future.264 At any rate, the court also found fault with 
Option B's requirement that licensees report the race of all job applicants.265 
From the court's perspective, such a requirement simply was not narrowly 
tailored "to further the Commission's stated goal of non-discrimination in the 
broadcast industry. "266 
5. MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Revisited: Through the Lens oflntergroup 
Competition for Employment Opportunities 
In MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, the D.C. Circuit failed to appreciate that group 
competition for access to employment opportunities formed the essential 
backdrop of the dispute in the case. Reframed from this perspective, the case 
presented two central questions: should dominant players continue to enjoy 
privileged access to information about employment opportunities, and should 
those dominant players be permitted to lock-out other competitors? If the D.C. 
Circuit had analyzed the case from this competition perspective, the outcome 
260 Id.; Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. F.C.C., 141 F.3d 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
261 See infra notes 281-87 and accompanying text. 
262 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 21. 
263 Id. (citing Shawv. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,909 (1996)). 
264 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 235 F.3d at 21 ("Option B places pressure upon each 
broadcaster to recruit minorities without a predicate finding that the particular broadcaster 
discriminated in the past or reasonably could be expected to do so in the future."). 
265 Id. at 22. 
266 Id. The D.C. Circuit's determination was inconsistent with the Eleventh Circuit's 
view on the standard of review for outreach programs. See Allen v. Alabama State Bd. of 
Educ., 164 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that strict scrutiny is generally 
inapplicable to outreach efforts), vacated, 216 F .3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Sussman 
v. Tanoue, 39 F. Supp. 2d 13, 27 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that FDIC's affirmative action 
program was "conscious of race but devoid of ultimate preferences," and therefore not 
subject to strict scrutiny). However, other courts have been more circumspect in their 
treatment of outreach programs. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. City of White House, 
191 F.3d 675, 692 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Outreach efforts may or may not require strict 
scrutiny."). 
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could have been completely different. This approach would have allowed the 
court to perceive more accurately the nature of the underlying problem-
specifically, how best to mediate the conflicting goals of members of racially 
and socially defined groups that are competing in the market for employment 
opportunities. 
Let us now retrace the court's analysis, using these two central questions as 
our guideposts. The court ruled that Option B created "pressure" to recruit 
minorities thereby according them a preference over white male candidates; 
thus, it embodied a "racial classification" that must be subject to strict scrutiny 
review."267 One response to that argument, however, is that strict scrutiny 
should not even have been applied in the case because the rational basis test 
was the more appropriate standard of review.268 Indeed, the FCC argued that 
the EEO rule should not be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny because 
"affirmative outreach," rather than creating a racial or gender preference for 
the job, simply expanded the applicant pool.269 An individual, the FCC 
maintained, has no constitutional right "to compete against fewer rivals for a 
job."27° From this perspective, the EEO rule was pro-competitive and intended 
to disrupt entrenched, exclusive informational networks. Thus, the FCC 
correctly, although unsuccessfully, argued that equal protection principles were 
not implicated.271 
First, the court was incorrect in viewing Option B as applying "pressure" on 
licensees such that strict scrutiny must necessarily apply. In fact, licensees 
were always free to select Option A, which did not pressure licensees to recruit 
women and minorities. 272 Option B was instituted at the broadcasters' behest, 
in an effort to provide licensees with "discretion to design an outreach program 
that is responsive to the needs of the broadcaster's organization and the local 
community."273 The "price" of discretion was a requirement that licensees 
demonstrate the inclusiveness of their program. 274 Option A was always 
available to licensees who did not wish to design their own outreach programs 
267 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 18-21. 
268 Under a rational basis test, the court decides only whether a challenged measure is 
rationally related to some legitimate government interest. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 ( 1955). 
269 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 20. 
210 Id. 
21 1 Id. 
272 Id. at 18-19 ("[W]e do not believe that the Broadcasters are meaningfully pressured 
under Option A to recruit women and minorities."). 
273 See Report & Order, supra note 233, 2374 ('I) 104) (acknowledging that a "number of 
broadcasters" had pushed the FCC for the flexibility to individually design outreach 
programs). 
274 Id. (requiring broadcasters electing Option B to collect data on their recruiting sources 
and subsequent pool of applicants). 
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or report on the race and gender compositions of their applicant pools.275 
Second, the D.C. Circuit was incorrect in ruling that licensees were 
pressured because the "Commission promises to investigate any licensee that 
reports 'few or no' applications from women or minorities."276 In so ruling, 
the D.C. Circuit also expressed skepticism that recruitment and outreach truly 
animated the EEO rule, suggesting instead that the rule was actually intended 
to guarantee proportional representation of minorities and women at broadcast 
stations.277 While it is true that the lack of minority or women in a licensee's 
applicant pool could trigger a Commission investigation, the Commission 
described the potential investigation in much different, and far more equivocal, 
terms: 
[I]n the case of those broadcasters who utilize applicant pool data, there is 
no requirement that the composition of applicant pools be proportionate 
to the composition of the local work force. However, few or no females 
or minorities in a broadcaster's applicant pools may be one indication 
(and only one indication) that the station's outreach efforts are not 
reaching the entire community. The representation of females and 
minorities in applicant pools is only one factor that we will look at in 
determining whether a broadcaster's outreach program is inclusive. We 
may ultimately determine that outreach efforts are reasonably designed to 
reach the entire community, even if few females or minorities actually 
apply for openings. Conversely, the fact that a sizeable number of 
females or minorities have applied for openings will not necessarily 
establish the inclusiveness of the station's efforts. Also, we recognize 
that an employer cannot control who applies for jobs. The only purpose 
of the data: collection is to give the broadcaster, the public, and the 
Commission more information by which to monitor the effectiveness of a 
station's outreach efforts so that the broadcaster can take appropriate 
action to modify its outreach efforts should the information indicate that 
they are not reaching the entire community.278 
The FCC's statement suggests that applicant pool data was only one factor to 
be examined in determining whether the outreach program was inclusive and 
that its true concern centered on the effectiveness of the licensee's outreach 
and recruitment program rather than on proportional representation. Yet 
275 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 17. Broadcast licensees electing Option A 
were not required to report the race, gender, and referral source of applicants. Report & 
Order, supra note 233, 2374 (1104). Notwithstanding the Commission's request to sever 
Option A from Option B, the court refused and vacated the rule in its entirety on the theory 
that severing the options would ''undercut the whole structure of the rule." MD/DC/DE 
Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 22. 
276 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 19 (emphasis added). 
277 Id. (stating that the "agency with life and death power over the license is interested in 
result, not process"). 
278 Report & Order, supra note 233, at 2378-79 (1120). 
1134 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1089 
potential sanctions for failing to enact an affirmative outreach program raises a 
much larger question: to what extent, if any, is requiring "affirmative 
outreach" discriminatory? 
The D.C. Circuit ruled that, because licensees were required under Option B 
to engage in inclusive outreach, strict scrutiny must apply.279 Such a 
conclusion, however, is clearly premised on the notion that nonminority 
applicants are disadvantaged by the EEO rule because they would receive less 
information about employment opportunities. Conversely, minorities and 
women would receive more opportunities because of it. 280 The difficulty is 
that this is exactly the state of affairs the FCC sought to rectify with its EEO 
rule but on behalf of women and minorities. The concern, from the FCC's 
perspective, was that the status quo maintained a system where minorities and 
women were being deprived of an opportunity to compete simply because of 
their race. The problem from the D.C. Circuit's perspective, was exactly the 
opposite. In this sense, the D.C. Circuit's ruling revealed how hard it is to tell 
the difference between affirmative action and nondiscrimination, and implicitly 
raised the question of which governmental body is best-suited to make that 
determination. 
Even assuming that strict scrutiny should have been applied in the case, the 
D.C. Circuit court still erred in its application of it. In MD/DC/DE 
Broadcasters, the court never resolved the question of whether the FCC's EEO 
rule was supported by a compelling governmental interest.281 Instead, the 
court ruled that it need not resolve that question because "the Broadcasters 
argue convincingly that the new EEO rule is not narrowly tailored to further 
that interest. "282 This sealed the fate of the EEO rule. A firm determination 
that the rule was animated by a compelling governmental interest would have 
changed the court's narrow tailoring analysis by forcing the court to articulate 
more clearly why Option B was not narrowly tailored either to remedy the 
effects of past discrimination or to prevent future discrimination from 
occurring. As it stood, the court's nonexistent compelling governmental 
interest analysis dictated the outcome of the narrow tailoring inquiry because 
the court was unable to appreciate the nature and extent of the problem the 
FCC was attempting to ameliorate.283 If we take a step back and look at the 
compelling governmental interest question through the lens of intergroup 
279 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 236 F.3d at 18-20. 
280 As the D.C. Circuit put it, "some prospective nonminority applicants who would have 
learned of job opportunities but for the Commission's directive now will be deprived of an 
opportunity to compete simply because of their race." Id. at 21 . 
28 1 Id. 
282 Id. 
283 The D.C. Circuit had condemned the EEO on the narrowly tailored analysis because, 
"[q]uite apart from the question of a compelling governmental interest, such a sweeping 
requirement is the antithesis of [a] rule narrowly tailored to meet a real problem." Id. 
( emphasis added). 
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competition, we see quite clearly how the analysis might have changed. 
Considering the underlying intergroup competition, the FCC's EEO rule 
was clearly justified by a compelling interest. Even if we assume that all 
broadcast licensees are private entities,284 when barriers to obtaining 
employment information exist, the government is not foreclosed from directing 
its licensees to attempt to remove those barriers. The FCC's EEO rule was an 
effort to reduce the discriminatory impact of word-of-mouth recruitment 
practices that had functioned as a barrier to entry to the market for employment 
at broadcast licensees. 285 These barriers had worked to the advantage of a 
particular race and gender in that market, and they had tended to allow for the 
perpetuation of a nondiverse workforce.286 The FCC concluded that "word-of-
mouth recruitment practices may be inherently discriminatory when minorities 
and women are poorly represented on an employer' s staff-particularly when 
they are scarce in the management ranks where hiring decisions are made."287 
Thus, such word-of-mouth recruitment practices were barriers to entry that 
operated to lock-out non-dominant market players. 
Because word-of-mouth recruitment both perpetuates the effects of past 
discriminatory activity and creates present discrimination by strengthening 
exclusionary labor hierarchies, the FCC has a strong interest in clearing these 
barriers to entry and creating open competition for employment at federally-
licensed broadcast stations. As Professors Ian Ayres and Frederic E. Vars have 
persuasively argued, "[ w ]hen inaction ('passive,' color-blind behavior) would 
tend to maintain racially segregated markets, the government has a compelling 
interest to counteract this effect."288 
Judged against this background, Option B was also narrowly tailored to 
achieve the objective of enhancing outreach to prospective minority 
candidates. The difficulty with the D.C. Circuit's approach to the narrow 
284 See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114-21 
(1973) (plurality opinion) (holding that broadcast licensees were private entities for the 
purposes of the First Amendment). 
285 Report & Order, supra note 233, at 2345 (i! 40). 
286 Id. (stating that outreach recruitment was necessary "so that the homogeneous 
workforce does not simply replicate itself'). 
287 Id. For instance, research has shown that informal recruitment networks such as 
word-of-mouth recruiting tend to replicate the extant workforce. PHILIP Moss & CHRIS 
TILLY, STORIES EMPLOYERS TELL: RACE, SKILL, AND HIRING IN AMERICA 226 (2001). This is 
the case because insiders tend to refer potential applicants with whom they enjoy a close 
relationship. Id. ( quoting a supervisor mentioning that "a lot of people [are] trying to help 
members of their family, friends. Get them a job, get them in the company"). Research also 
suggests that word-of-mouth recruiting discourages outsiders from applying for jobs even 
where there is knowledge of job availability by reaffirming the perception that a particular 
firm is dominated by members of a particular group. Id. at 227. In this manner, informal 
recruitment networks "amplif[y] the effect of separation between groups," accentuating the 
rivalry between socially and racially defined groups. Id. 
288 Ayres & Vars, supra note 139, at 1610. 
1136 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1089 
tailoring inquiry was that it refused to view Option B as addressing the real 
problem: the need for effective outreach to women and minority communities. 
Instead, the court viewed Option B as a carefully-veiled preference scheme 
intended to achieve proportional representation of women and minorities 
within the licensee's workforce.289 This flawed approach grew directly from 
the D.C. Circuit's failure to conduct a meaningful compelling governmental 
interest inquiry. 
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit, the FCC's position was that the requirement 
of submission of applicant pool data was intended to "give the broadcaster, the 
public, and the Commission more information by which to monitor the 
effectiveness of a station's outreach efforts."290 Viewing Option Bas an effort 
to enhance inclusiveness and to level the playing field for all competitors, it 
becomes very difficult to see how a licensee-designed outreach program could 
be monitored for effectiveness in the absence of any applicant pool data. In 
addition, the FCC's EEO rule as a whole also contained a race-neutral 
alternative. Recall that broadcast licensees were always free to choose Option 
A, which did not "place a special emphasis upon the presence of women and 
minorities in the target audience."291 Option B was triggered only at the 
licensee's option.292 Viewed from this perspective, Option B was narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. 
This case shows very clearly the competitive dynamics of a particular 
market-i.e., the market for employment with the FCC's broadcast licensees. 
By refusing to acknowledge these dynamics, the court turned a blind eye to 
systematic anticompetitive conduct, which had created unfair competitive 
advantages enjoyed by a particular group. As a result, the court perpetuated 
the existing anticompetitive structure rather than allowing the FCC to try to 
construct an even playing field. 
B. Competition in Education: Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public 
Schools 
Education is another key area in which blacks and whites compete for 
access to resources. In education, patterns of private discriminatory (and 
anticompetitive) conduct-aided and abetted by governmental actors-has 
operated to lock-in benefits for whites at the expense of blacks. In Eisenberg 
v. Montgomery County Public Schools, a governmental actor attempted to 
disrupt this anticompetitive system and was rebuffed by the Fourth Circuit.293 
As we saw in the employment context, the court's failure to analyze the 
underlying competitive landscape results in a decision that protects the existing 
anticompetitive structure. 
289 MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. F.C.C., 236 F.3d 13, 21-22 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
290 Report & Order, supra note 233, at 2378 (if 120). 
291 MD/DC/DE Broadcasting, 236 F.3d at 19. 
292 Report & Order, supra note 233, at 2374 (i! 104). 
293 197 F.3d 123, 124 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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In Eisenberg, a white elementary school student, Jacob Eisenberg, argued 
that a school district transfer policy that had prevented his transfer into a 
magnet program because of the potential "impact on diversity" was a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 294 While the district court had denied 
Eisenberg's motion for a preliminary injunction that would have compelled his 
admittance into the magnet program, the Fourth Circuit granted the injunction 
because "such race based governmental actions are presumed to be invalid and 
are subject to strict scrutiny."295 Again, some background on the origins of the 
transfer policy, and Eisenberg's challenge to it, is in order. 
1. The Montgomery County Public Schools Transfer Policy 
Like many other metropolitan areas, Montgomery County, Maryland 
experienced significant demographic shifts in the 1970's and the 1980's. 
During that time, the number of minority students attending the County's 
public schools swelled so that by the 1993-94 school year almost half of the 
students attending the county's public schools were minorities.296 This was an 
increase from 1970, when minority students accounted for only eight percent 
of the county's school population.297 Correspondingly, during the same period, 
the percentage of students that were white fell from ninety-two percent to fifty-
eight percent. 298 
In 1977, the county had instituted a magnet schools program "in an attempt 
to desegregate areas of the county that at one time were considered most 
vulnerable to segregation. "299 One purpose of the magnet program was to 
"attract and retain diverse student enrollment on a voluntary basis to schools 
outside the area in which a student lives."300 Subsequently, Montgomery 
County developed a transfer policy, which allowed transfers among schools in 
the district based upon five factors, one of which was the "diversity profile" or 
racial composition of the transferee school.3°1 While transfers that adversely 
affected diversity were usually denied, white students were not singled out for 
294 Id. at 125-30. 
295 Id. at I 33. 
296 GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET 
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 210 (1996) (stating that "(I]n the 1993-94 
school year, 42.3 percent of students were members of minority groups"). 
291 Id. 
298 Id. at 387 n.7. 
299 Id. at 209. 
300 Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 125 . While Montgomery County's school system had never 
been the subject of a court order requiring it to desegregate its schools, the system was 
segregated prior to the implementation of its voluntary magnet program. Id. ; see also 
ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 296, at 207. 
301 Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 19 F. Supp. 2d 449,451 (D. Md. 1998); 
see also ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 296, at 213 (identifying the factors considered in the 
calculation of the "diversity profile"). 
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unfavorable treatment. 302 
In the 1998-1999 school year, Jacob Eisenberg sought a transfer to the 
Rosemary Hills elementary school in order to take advantage of its magnet 
math and science program.303 Jacob's family believed that the transfer was 
necessary in order to provide him with the "best opportunity for realizing his 
personal and academic potential."304 Jacob's residence would otherwise have 
dictated that he attend the Glen Haven Elementary School, which had 
experienced a sharp drop in white enrollment in the years immediately 
preceding Jacob's transfer request.305 Montgomery County denied Jacob's 
transfer request because of the "impact on diversity" since white enrollment at 
Glen Haven had dropped so significantly.306 
2. Eisenberg's Challenge to Montgomery County's Transfer Policy in the 
United States District Court 
Jacob Eisenberg lost at the district court level because the court was 
convinced that a ruling in Eisenberg's favor could "lead to racial isolation 
among certain schools in the District."307 In assessing Eisenberg's motion for 
a preliminary injunction, the district court began with a strict scrutiny 
analysis.308 Given the race-based nature of Montgomery County's 
determination, there was little question that strict scrutiny would apply to its 
denial of the transfer request.309 Montgomery County argued that two interests 
302 Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 126. "[A]t some schools, African-Americans are generally not 
allowed to transfer out. At other schools, white transfers are for the most part not approved. 
At a substantial number of schools, transfers are approved without consideration of the 
impact on racial or ethnic makeup of the affected schools." Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 
454 (recapping the school district's argument that the "diversity profile" does not single out 
whites). 
303 Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 125. 
304 Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (quoting the stated reason included on the student's 
transfer request form). 
305 Id. Jacob was one of nineteen white students seeking a transfer from Glen Haven in 
1998, which was consistent with enrollment trends at Glen Haven. Id. Between 1994 and 
1998, the percentage of white enrollment at Glen Haven dropped from 38.9 percent to 24. l 
percent. Id. In the year that Jacob made his transfer request, Glen Haven had the following 
racial breakdown: 24.1 percent of the school's students were white, 40.5 percent were 
African-American, 25 percent were Hispanic and 10.1 percent were Asian. Id. Glen 
Haven's percentage of white students was far less than the county-wide average which 
hovered just over 50 percent. Id. 
306 See Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 125 n. l (noting that, absent special circumstances, the 
school district refused to permit any white students to transfer out of Glen Haven 
Elementary School). 
307 See Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 452. 
308 See id. 
309 See id. 
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justified its determination.310 The first was the desire to promote diversity.311 
With respect to the increasingly controversial question of whether diversity 
could form the basis of a compelling governmental interest, the district court 
responded affirmatively, ruling "that the diversity interest remains a 
compelling governmental interest in the context now being considered."312 
The County also attempted to support the transfer denial on a second, 
separate rationale. Montgomery County must retain the authority to deny 
transfer requests in order to avoid "facilitating through its actions private 
conduct that leads to a discriminatory environment."313 Montgomery County's 
argument boiled down to a broad assertion that the court must recognize the 
reality of "white flight" so that governmental actors would not be forced to 
facilitate conduct that would lead to resegregation. 
The district court did not shy away from the County's desire to avoid 
facilitating segregation. The district court accepted Montgomery County's 
assertion, fearing that forcing the County to grant transfer requests would 
result in "segregative enrollment patterns that might themselves constitute 
violations of the law."314 In reaching this conclusion, the district court reached 
back to the Supreme Court's discussion of "passive participation" in City of 
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.315 to unearth an appropriate analogy.316 In 
Croson, the Supreme Court recognized that a governmental actor could take 
appropriate steps to prevent "its tax dollars from assisting these organizations 
in maintaining a racially segregated construction market."317 For the district 
court, Montgomery County faced a similar quandary: without the ability to 
deny nonintegrative transfers, the result might well be "extremely low 
percentages of minorities, or nonminorities in certain public schools."318 
Thus, from the district court's perspective, Montgomery County had a 
compelling government interest in avoiding segregative enrollment patterns.319 
Having affirmed the existence of a compelling government interest, the court 
considered whether Montgomery County's transfer policy was narrowly 
310 Id. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. at 453. The court discussed Justice Powell's decision in Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978). Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 453. 
Powell argued that diversity in a student body enhances informal learning. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
at 312. 
313 Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
314 Id. 
3l5 488 U.S. 469 (1988). 
316 Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
317 Croson, 488 U.S. at 503, quoted in Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
318 Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
319 Id. (maintaining that the Montgomery County School District has a "compelling 
interest in not facilitating a discriminatory environment" that would result from segregated 
enrollment patterns). 
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tailored. The court was persuaded that Montgomery County's policy neither 
singled out any particular racial group for disfavored treatment nor used 
"quotas."32° Consequently, the district court concluded that, "on balance, the 
District's policies have been designed as narrowly as ' possible while still 
furthering the District's stated interests. "321 
3. Eisenberg's Challenge to Montgomery County's Transfer Policy in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding 
that the County could not consider an applicant's race in granting or denying a 
transfer request.322 The court's analysis mirrored that of the D.C. Circuit in 
MD/DC/DE Broadcasters in its approach to the compelling governmental 
interest prong of strict scrutiny review.323 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit 
"assume[d], without holding .. . that diversity may be ~ compelling 
governmental interest," and then proceeded to question whether the transfer 
policy was narrowly tailored.324 As was the case in MD/DC/DE Broadcasters, 
without anchoring the court's opinion with a clear examination or 
determination that there is a strong compelling interest animating the 
governmental action at issue, the outcome of the narrow tailoring analysis is 
preordained. 
First, in making such an assumption, the Fourth Circuit conveniently 
blended the two separate rationales that Montgomery County had originally 
put forward to justify the transfer denial.325 At the district court level, the 
County had put forward both its interest in promoting a diverse student body 
and its interest in avoiding the "creation, through District action, of segregative 
enrollment patterns that might themselves constitute violations of the law" as 
sufficiently compelling to justify the transfer policy.326 
The Fourth Circuit, however, believed these interests to be "one and the 
same," thus distilling the two into a single desire to achieve racial diversity.327 
Thus, the Fourth Circuit ignored what the district court had clearly recognized, 
that Montgomery County "obviously has a compelling interest in not 
320 Id. 
321 Id. In deciding whether the policy was narrowly tailored, the district court also found 
that, given the goal as articulated, no race-neutral alternatives were available, and that 
periodic review of the transfer program would ensure that the transfer policy was "as narrow 
as possible." Id. at 454-55. 
322 Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 133-34 (4th Cir. 1999). 
323 See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text (discussing the court's compelling 
interest analysis in MD/DC/DE Broadcasters). 
324 Eisenberg, 197- F.3d at 130 (stressing that "[n]o inference may here be taken that we 
are of [the] opinion that racial diversity is a compelling government interest"). 
325 Id. 
326 Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 452. 
321 Id. 
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facilitating a discriminatory environment through state action. "328 Assuming 
without holding that racial diversity was a compelling governmental interest, 
the court effectively removed the question of governmental facilitation of 
discriminatory private conduct from the case, thereby allowing it to ignore this 
difficult issue. The stage was now set for the decisive narrow tailoring 
analysis, which allowed the Fourth Circuit to strike down the County's plan. 
Once the Fourth Circuit framed the question the way it did-"[Is] 
Montgomery County's use of racial classification in its transfer decisions ... 
narrowly tailored to the interest of obtaining diversity?"329-the answer 
became practically inevitable. Within the context of the Fourth Circuit's 
narrow tailoring analysis, "racial diversity" simply became "nonremedial racial 
balancing. "330 As the court noted, "[Montgomery County's transfer policy] is 
mere racial balancing in a pure form, even at its inception."331 The court 
believed the transfer policy was aimed merely at "keeping certain percentages 
of racial/ethnic groups within each school."332 Such an end, in and of itself, 
simply could not be constitutionally sound. 333 
This reasoning is simply circular; it amounts to ruling that racial balancing 
is unconstitutional because racial balancing is unconstitutional. The court's 
reference to prior and controlling Fourth Circuit precedent, however, reveals a 
more satisfying answer: racial balancing is per se unconstitutional because it 
lacks an adequate factual predicate sufficient to support a narrowly tailored 
remedy. 334 At its core, the constitutional infirmity of racial balancing is that it 
seeks to achieve a certain racial representation without sufficient proof that the 
disparity which occasioned its use is the result of identified discrimination on 
the part of either the governmental entity or some private actor whom the 
governmental entity has aided or abetted.335 In this respect, the constitutional 
328 Id. at 454. 
329 Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 131. 
330 See id. 
331 Id. 
332 Id. 
333 Id. at 133. The court reasoned that Montgomery County was engaged in racial 
balancing, a practice that the court had previously invalidated. Id. Accordingly, 
Montgomery County's rejection of the transfer application was "invalidated because it was 
giving effect to an unconstitutional policy." Id. 
334 See id. (citing Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir. 1999), 
and Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 160 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
335 The Fourth Circuit's discussion of the constitutionality of a race-based scholarship 
program in Podberesky is instructive on this point: 
The district court has approved the use of the Banneker Program to affirmatively admit 
African-American students solely on the basis of race until the composition of African-
Americans on the University campus reflects the percentage of African-American 
Maryland high school graduates who potentially might participate in higher education 
at UMCP, without an accurate determination of either the extent to which the present 
disparity exists, . . . or the extent to which that disparity flows from past 
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infirmity in Eisenberg mirrored that which was discovered in MD/DC/DE 
Broadcasters-specifically, the failure to identify specific instances of past 
discrimination sufficient to support the race-based program at issue. 336 
4. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools: Through the Lens of 
Intergroup Competition in the Public School System 
What if the Fourth Circuit had approached the dispute in Eisenberg with an 
eye toward intergroup competition within the context of public education? 
There are least two ways in which this approach could have impacted the 
court's decision. The first approach would explicitly recognize the importance 
of admission to magnet schools. Over the years we have observed a constant 
struggle about the meaning of educational equality. These struggles have 
taken place in a variety of contexts and across all educational levels, from 
elementary school to graduate school.337 But at all levels, the disputes were 
about more than simply what the content of a particular entry requirement 
should be. These fights also had an instrumental quality because admission 
into a particular educational institution also determined access to the 
significant social and economic advantages that such an education provided. 
Recently, an increasing number of suits have challenged the use of race 
conscious admissions standards at public schools and in particular have 
targeted the use of race as a factor in determining admission to public elite and 
"magnet" schools.338 Eisenberg is firmly part of this new trend. 
discrimination . . . . The program thus could remain in force indefinitely based on 
arbitrary statistics unrelated to constitutionally permissible purposes . . .. We are thus 
of opinion that, as analyzed by the district court, the program more resembles outright 
racial balancing than a tailored remedy program. As such, it is not narrowly tailored to 
remedy past discrimination. In fact, it is not tailored at all. 
Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 160. 
336 For an incisive analysis of Eisenberg and two other recent Fourth Circuit public 
school cases that arguably " invite a new era of de facto school segregation," see John 
Charles Boger, Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety and the Resegregation of 
Public Schools, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1719 (2000). 
337 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1987) (sustaining a 
challenge against an affirmative action plan at a public medical school); Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (sustaining a challenge to de jure segregation of public schools); 
Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2000) (sustaining a challenge to an 
affirmative action plan at a public law school). 
338 See, e.g., Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(challenging a magnet school admissions plan that used racial ratios to determine student 
assignment); Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch., 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000) (challenging 
an interdistrict transfer program intended to reduce racial isolation); Eisenberg v. 
Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999) (challenging a race conscious 
magnet school transfer policy); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 
1999) (arguing that lottery admissions system for an alternative kindergarten which took 
race into account was unconstitutional); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(challenging the constitutionality of Boston Latin School's race conscious admission 
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The second approach would explicitly recognize the reality of "white 
flight." From this perspective, the court could have considered the type of 
private discriminatory exclusion the transfer plan was intended to prevent or at 
least not to facilitate: "white flight" from substantially minority public 
schools.339 From this standpoint, the transfer policy would also be viewed 
against the backdrop of intensifying racial segregation in our nation's public 
schools.340 Triggered by "systematic avoidance" of interracial contact, white 
migration from urban public schools is a perceptible phenomenon, and public 
schools in metropolitan areas are increasingly becoming racially segregated.341 
As Professor Gary Orfield has suggested, "[i]n a society with a rapidly 
growing minority population and little stable residential integration, unless 
there are successful strategies to stabilize either school or housing integration 
or both, there will be a great deal of resegregation and decline in white 
enrollment."342 Montgomery's transfer policy, intended to "ensure racial and 
ethnic diversity of the schools of the County,"343 was an attempt to prevent 
such an outcome and to "equalize integration" across the county.344 
Given these approaches, the underlying dispute in Eisenberg is not simply 
about who will be admitted to a particular magnet program. Rather, it revolves 
around the question of whether the governmental interest in disrupting patterns 
of private discriminatory exclusion which provide manifold advantages to a 
dominant group outweighs an individual's interest in having access to a 
magnet program. While the district court took cognizance of this by explicitly 
recognizing the relationship between the County's actions and "segregative 
policy); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224 
(W.D. Wash. 2001) (challenging a racial "tiebreaker" for school district's open choice 
assignment plan); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 100 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. Mass. 2000) 
(alleging that a plan intended to eliminate racial isolation within school district was 
unconstitutional); Boston Children First v. Boston, 62 F. Supp. 2d 247 (D. Mass. 1999) 
(challenging city-wide student assignment plan that used race as a factor in determining 
student placement). But see Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 
358 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (addressing a challenge by African-American parents to magnet 
school program that capped black student enrollment at a particular level). 
339 See Jeffrey R. Henig, Race and Choice in Montgomery County, Maryland, Magnet 
Schools, 96 TCHRS. C. REC. 729, 731 (1995) ("[T]he pattern of [transfer] requests in 
Montgomery County suggests that-unless aggressively regulated by authorities-the 
direction in which choice points may exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, racial 
segregation."). 
340 See Orfield, supra note 154, at 16, 48. 
341 Charles T. Clotfelter, Are Whites Still Fleeing? Racial Patterns and Enrollment Shifts 
in Urban Public Schools, 1987-1996, 201. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 199,217 (2001). 
342 Orfield, supra note 154, at 8. 
343 Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 19 F. Supp. 2d 449,454 (D. Md. 1998). 
344 See Orfield, supra note 154, at 8 ("[W]hite enrollment is most stable when there are 
large school districts that both tend to equalize integration and to deny the possibility of 
finding nearby all-white schools."). 
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enrollment patterns,"345 the Fourth Circuit declined to do so and glossed over 
the intergroup competitive dynamic against which the County acted. In doing 
so, the Fourth Circuit left intact the existing structure, built on a foundation of 
anti-competitive conduct that continues to lock-out blacks from the resources 
and benefits enjoyed by whites. 
C. Competition in Housing: Walker v. City of Mesquite 
The market for housing, like the markets for employment and to education, 
display clear competitive dynamics. Walker v. City of Mesquite346 illustrates 
the built-in advantages enjoyed by a racially and socially defined group as a 
result of prior discriminatory state action. The state's attempts to disrupt this 
system are rebuffed by the court in a manner quite similar to those we have 
seen in employment and education. Again, the court chose to leave intact a 
system built on anti-competitive conduct that has locked-in benefits for one 
group at the expense of another. 
In Walker, the Fifth Circuit held unconstitutional a remedial order requiring 
that newly constructed public housing units be located in predominantly white 
neighborhoods in Dallas. 347 The district court based its remedial order on a 
judicial finding not only of generations of intentional discrimination in the 
Dallas public housing program, but also of recalcitrance on the part of the 
responsible government officials in ameliorating the effects of that 
discrimination. 348 Walker, like MD/DC/DE Broadcasters and Eisenberg, is not 
a "classic" affirmative action case. Again, some background is in order. 
1. The Early Phases of the Walker Litigation 
The Walker litigation began in 1985, when minority recipients of federal 
housing assistance sued the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
("HUD"), the Dallas Housing Authority ("DHA"), and several Dallas 
metropolitan area suburbs for racial discrimination in the administration of a 
federal housing assistance program. 349 That litigation resulted in the district 
court approving a consent decree in 1987.350 Two years later, the district court 
joined the City of Dallas to the decree and made the city a party in the lawsuit 
345 See Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
346 169 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Walker V]. 
347 Id. at 975-76. 
348 See id. at 976-77 (outlining the procedural history of case); see Walker v. HUD, 734 
F. Supp. 1289, 1293 (N.D. Tex. 1989) [hereinafter Walker 11/j ("At any time-yes, at any 
time-the City of Dallas could have forced DHA to stop its deliberate policy of strict racial 
segregation in low-income public housing in Dallas." (emphasis in original)). 
349 Walker v. HUD, 912 F.2d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Walker JV]. The 
suburban communities were later dismissed from the litigation after they agreed to 
participate in the federal Section 8 program. Id. at 822. 
350 Walker V, 169 F.3d at 976. 
2002] INTERGROUP RIVALRY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 1145 
because the city was a "substantial cause of DHA's deliberate racial 
segregation and discrimination in its public housing programs in Dallas."351 
In joining the City of Dallas to the decree, the district court canvassed the 
history of the DHA and found that, "[t]rom its beginning, the primary purpose 
of DHA's public housing program was to prevent blacks from moving into 
white areas of this city."352 The DHA accomplished this through a variety of 
methods, including: repeatedly and intentionally siting public housing 
developments in "Negro slum areas,"353 yielding to demands from white 
property owners that "Negro project[s]" not be sited in white areas;354 
constructing the racially segregated West Dallas project with "separate parks 
and commercial areas ... for the separate races,"355 and refusing to allow most 
minority tenants to use Section 8 housing assistance certificates that would 
have allowed them to secure housing in suburban areas.356 As a result, blacks 
"were purposefully segregated for decades into either Section 8 housing in 
minority areas of Dallas or predominantly black housing projects in minority 
areas of Dallas."357 
The 1987 consent decree required the defendants to demolish and replace 
several thousand dilapidated housing units, and to "assist black families joining 
the Section 8 program in finding housing in white areas of Dallas."358 The 
DHA did not comply, engaging in a long period of recalcitrance and repeatedly 
violating the decree.359 The district court ultimately vacated the 1987 decree 
because the remnants of intentional segregation remained, granted summary 
judgment on liability for plaintiffs, and entered remedial orders affecting the 
DHA and HUD.360 These remedial orders are the subject of the Walker v. City 
of Mesquite. 361 More specifically, the remedial order affecting the DHA, like 
351 Walker 111, 734 F. Supp. at 1290 ("Throughout the history of the [Dallas Housing 
Authority}, the City has known of DHA 's blatant practices of racial segregation and 
discrimination, .. . not only did the City refase to intervene to stop these illegal practices, it 
actually participated in this conscious discrimination against minorities in public housing in 
Dallas." (emphasis in original)). 
352 Id. at 1293. 
353 Id. 
354 Id. at 1294. 
355 Id. at 1296. 
356 Id. at 1300. See generally George Rodrigue, Craig Flournoy and David Tarrant, 
Segregation in Dallas: How Integration of Housing Failed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 
14, 1985, 1985 WL 4017103 (noting that "[ a ]ffluent communities in and around Dallas have 
slammed their doors" to a federal initiative aimed at developing low income housing in 
suburbs and the DHA "has yet to build desperately needed family housing outside 
minorities areas"). 
357 Walker V, 169 F.3d 973,976 (5th Cir. 1999). 
358 Id. at 977. 
359 Id. 
360 Id. 
361 Id. at 975-76. 
1146 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1089 
the 1987 consent decree before it, required the DHA to demolish certain public 
housing units and replace those units through new construction and Section 8 
assistance.362 Key to the DHA remedial order was the requirement that the 
DHA "develop all new public housing units in predominantly white areas until 
there are as many units in predominantly white areas as there are in minority 
areas. "363 
2. The Challenge to the Remedial Order 
In Walker, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the construction of two forty-unit 
public housing projects adjacent to their neighborhoods.364 The plaintiffs, who 
were white, lived in a neighborhood that was more than sixty percent white.365 
They asserted two arguments. First, they argued that they were the victims of 
purposeful racial discrimination because the defendants had singled their 
neighborhood out to accommodate the new projects on the basis of race. 366 
Second, they argued that the siting decision would "inflict specific injury 
including decreased property values, increased crime and population density, 
environmental problems, and diminished aesthetic values of the 
neighborhood."367 The district court had denied the plaintiffs' request for 
injunctive relief, but the Fifth Circuit vacated the remedial order.368 
At the outset, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs that they would be 
injured by the proposed construction plan.369 Why was this the case? The 
court opined that the challenged remedial order embodied a racial 
classification because "these homeowner's 'whiteness' is one of two 
controlling elements which identified the specific sites adjacent to their 
neighborhoods for new public housing construction."370 Thus, the very 
presence of an explicit racial classification within the remedial order generated 
standing to sue.371 With this determination, the Fifth Circuit confirmed that the 
362 Id. at 977. 
363 Id. The remedial order defined "predominantly white area" as any area with less than 
thirty-seven percent minority residents. Id. at 977-78. 
364 Id. at 978. 
365 Id. at 979 (noting that the DHA selected the plaintiffs' neighborhood primarily 
because it was more than sixty-three percent white). 
366 Id. 
367 Id. 
368 Id. at 988. In the district court, a group of tenants in the public housing program 
sought a declaratory judgment that the remedial orders were constitutional. Id. at 976. The 
district court found for the tenants, but the Fifth Circuit reversed. Id. at 988. In a separate 
action that was consolidated, residents sought a stay of construction. Id. The district court 
entered judgment against the homeowners, but the Fifth Circuit enforced the stay. Id. 
369 Id. at 978-81. 
370 Id. at 979. 
371 See id. at 980-81 ("In general, the racial classification of the homeowners is an injury 
in and of itself."). The court in Walker V mentioned also that the homeowners alleged 
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homeowners' sued for an injury grounded in their race as a shared 
characteristic, as well as for any economic or aesthetic injury generated by 
construction of the projects in their neighborhoods.372 
The Fifth Circuit ruled that because the remedial order required the siting of 
the new public housing projects in predominantly white areas, the decision 
amounted to a "racial classification" scheme to which strict scrutiny must 
apply. 373 Like the courts in both MD/DC/DE Broadcasters and Eisenberg, the 
Fifth Circuit did not discuss the nature or scope of the government's 
compelling governmental interest in its strict scrutiny analysis. The plaintiffs 
cleverly conceded that the remedial order was supported by the compelling 
governmental interest of "remedy[ing] the vestiges of past discrimination and 
segregation within Dallas's public housing programs."374 Thus, the court 
found it unnecessary to engage in any significant examination of the 
underpinnings of that interest. 375 Instead, the court simply assumed that a 
compelling governmental interest animated the remedial order, and proceeded 
directly to the narrow tailoring inquiry.376 Consequently, the narrow tailoring 
discussion had an otherworldly quality, consisting of the court carefully 
engaging in a five factor balancing test imported from the Supreme Court's 
opinion in United States v. Paradise,377 but making little reference to the 
governmental interest which the narrow tailoring analysis was intended to 
modify. 
The Fifth Circuit ruled that the remedial order was not narrowly tailored 
because . a race-neutral remedy was available that could achieve the same 
desegregation. 378 The narrow tailoring analysis was premised on the notion 
that the construction of new public housing projects in predominantly white 
areas was race-conscious, but that the provision of Section 8 housing 
assistance with the express intent of moving minority families into privately 
owned rental housing in predominantly white areas was actually race-
potential loss of property value as well as other problems like crime and aesthetic value. Id. 
at 980. The court added, "HUD and DHA cite no cases in which standing has been denied 
to homeowners who asserted their quality of life and property values would be diminished 
by a next-door public housing or other HUD project." Id. 
372 See id. at 980-81. 
373 Id. at 981 -82 ("Any race-conscious remedial measure receives strict scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause. This is true no matter which race is burdened or benefitted by 
the racial classification in question." (citations omitted)). 
374 See id. at 981-82. 
375 Id. at 982. 
376 Id. 
377 480 U.S. 149 (1987). In Paradise, the court upheld a district court's order that 
required the Alabama Department of Public Safety to promote one black officer for every 
white officer promoted. Id. at 153. Applying strict scrutiny, a plurality of the Court 
concluded that the order was narrowly tailored because there was no other viable option 
available to the Court. Id. at 177. 
378 Walker V, 169 F.3d at 982-88. 
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neutral. 379 As Martha Mahoney has persuasively explained, it was bizarre to 
label the provision of Section 8 certificates to minority tenants to desegregate 
white areas as race-neutral, while at the same time characterizing the 
construction of two forty-unit apartment complexes in white neighborhoods 
race-conscious, and therefore ultimately unconstitutional. 380 Both modes of 
remedial action sought exactly the same race-conscious end: the placement of 
minority tenants in white neighborhoods.381 Indeed, there is an argument that, 
because both modes of remedy seek race-conscious ends, both are equally 
unconstitutional. 382 But such an argument is inapplicable in a situation where 
the court is evaluating an attempt to remedy invidious discrimination supported 
by significant recalcitrance on the part of the responsible government entity. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit ignored questions raised about 
the efficacy of Section 8 certificates for producing actual desegregation. The 
district court had ruled that the provision of Section 8 certificates alone was not 
an adequate remedy because reliance on the private market alone would not 
disestablish the vestiges of the prior discrimination. 383 Thus, the district court 
had determined that "Section 8 needed to be combined with new construction 
or acquisition in predominantly white areas in order to remedy the effects of 
past discrimination."384 But from the Fifth Circuit's perspective, if Section 8 
could somehow be shown to be an effective desegregation method, then there 
379 Id. at 983-85 (calling Section 8 a "race-neutral measure" and indicating that it is 
"superior to a race-conscious remedy in that it allows market forces and personal 
preferences rather than racial criteria to guide the homemaking decision"). Section 8 
housing vouchers provide housing assistance to eligible recipients so that they can secure 
housing in the private rental market. See Federal Rental Assistance: Overview of the 
Section 8 Program, 76 CONG. DIG. 229, 232 (1997). 
380 Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Remedy: Under-Ruling Civil Rights in Walker v. 
City of Mesquite, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1309, 1351-52 (2000) ("Bizarrely, the Walker court 
calls 'race neutral ' a plan to give certificates to African Americans who were victims of 
discrimination, even when it approves sending these tenants to 'nonblack' neighborhoods, 
but it calls 'race-conscious' a plan to put two small apartment complexes into white 
neighborhoods." (emphasis in original)). 
38 1 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 977, 984-85 (discussing the goals of Section 8 and of the 
district court' s remedial order). 
382 See Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative 
Action, 88 GEO. L.J . 2331 , 2333 (2000) ("[S]trict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause 
is triggered by a law motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose, regardless of whether 
the law employs an express racial classification or is race-neutral on its face. As the 
Supreme Court's affirmative action cases establish, the purpose to benefit racial minorities 
is a discriminatory purpose."). 
383 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 983-85 (discussing the basis for the district court ' s 
remedial order). 
384 See id. at 984; Mahoney, supra note 380, at 1347 ("Studies of Section 8 housing 
around the United States published after the district court's remedial order show that, 
without race-conscious intervention, Section 8 often fails to produce desegregation."). 
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was no reason to trammel the alleged rights of third parties. 385 Thus, the Fifth 
Circuit required that the race-neutral Section 8 program be used and clearly 
found to fail prior to the institution of race-conscious public housing siting 
decisions.386 The district court's finding that if defendants did not "attach a 
race-conscious site selection criterion to new construction, then the new units 
[would] end up in minority areas," was rejected as "unfounded."387 
What Walker shares with MD/DC/DE Broadcasters and Eisenberg is the 
brevity of the compelling governmental analysis in conjunction with a robust 
narrow tailoring inquiry. But if there was any reason to jettison the compelling 
governmental interest analysis in MD/DC/DE Broadcasters and Eisenberg, 
there is even less of one in Walker. Both MD/DC/DE Broadcasters and 
Eisenberg featured essentially voluntary actions on the part of governmental 
actors to ameliorate or guard against discrimination in the private market, 
while Walker featured a governmental actor who had to be dragged, "kicking 
and screaming," to recognize its own complicity in racial discrimination. 
3. Walker v. City of Mesquite: Through the Lens of Intergroup 
Competition for Housing Opportunities 
What if the Fifth Circuit had analyzed the dispute from the standpoint of 
intergroup competition for housing opportunities? The framework of the 
analysis would have changed and a different outcome would have been 
possible. As was the case in MD/DC/DE Broadcasters and Eisenberg, the 
dispute in Walker conies down to this: may dominant players continue to enjoy 
privileged access to opportunities and be allowed to "lock-out" other 
competitors in the process? Viewing the dispute in Walker from this 
perspective, how might this approach have changed the court's analysis? 
The Walker court's lack of discussion of the nature of the compelling 
governmental interest involved is deeply problematic. By assuming that the 
defendants had a compelling governmental interest in remedying "the vestiges 
of past discrimination and segregation within Dallas 's public housing 
programs,"388 the court focused on the potential of the race-neutral Section 8 
remedy without having to examine the scope and nature of the underlying 
problem. 
Instead, imagine if the court ' s analysis had viewed the dispute from the 
perspective of intergroup competition for housing opportunities and searched 
for potential barriers to entry to the housing market. From this perspective, the 
white homeowners in Walker were the beneficiaries of prior discriminatory 
governmental regulation. The governmental defendants in Walker had used 
385 See Walker V, 169 F.3d at 984-85. 
386 Id. at 985 ("When Section 8 has evidenced such promising results, options such as 
these should be explored and tested before adopting a race-conscious remedy as a last 
resort."). 
387 Id. at 985. 
388 Id. at 981. 
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blatantly discriminatory means to create and maintain separate white and black 
neighborhoods within the Dallas metropolitan area for several generations.389 
Until the remedial order at issue in Walker, the white homeowners had enjoyed 
the benefits that came with living in a predominantly white neighborhood 
without worrying about the pressures that could be created by minority 
entrants. 
While the plaintiffs were not necessarily acting with animus, it is also fair to 
say that they were the beneficiaries of a previous government "charter" that 
mandated racial segregation in Dallas metropolitan area neighborhoods and, 
concomitantly, within the surrounding schools. One way of seeing Walker, 
then, is as an attempt to preserve a built-in advantage that had been created by 
prior discriminatory state action. That discriminatory state action had created a 
tangible benefit by erecting a barrier of entry against rival racial and socially 
defined groups in the same manner that a benefit is bestowed by governmental 
regulation or licensing creating a regulatory monopoly. Prior governmental 
action had acted as a barrier to entry to white neighborhoods and schools, and 
the Walker plaintiffs successfully sought to maintain that barrier by urging the 
judicial system to rule in their favor. 
From this perspective, it would also be possible to see that the dispute in 
Walker was necessarily linked to the interrelationship of race, housing, and 
education. Many of the same themes animate both Walker and Eisenberg. For 
instance, we know that a majority of whites are extremely hesitant to inhabit 
neighborhoods with more than a token number of black residents.390 Thus, 
white out-migration grows as the number of minority neighbors increases.391 
In addition, many white residents actively relocate to areas where white 
residency is predominant in order to avoid integration.392 Additionally, the 
aversion to living in neighborhoods with black residents functions to maintain 
a discriminatory housing market, as the real estate industry seeks to cater to the 
"presumed values of customers. "393 
"White flight" has the effect of stripping whites from more racially diverse 
neighborhoods and injecting them into areas already containing high 
389 See Walker JJJ, 734 F. Supp 1289, 1293-1309 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (summarizing the 
history of deliberate segregation in public housing in Dallas by the DHA). 
39° Kyle Crowder, The Racial Context of White Mobility: An Individual-Leve/ Assessment 
of the White Flight Hypothesis, 29 Soc. SCI. RES. 223, 244 (2000) ("[R]esearch consistently 
shows that a majority of Whites prefer neighborhoods that are all-or nearly all-White and 
are willing to tolerate only a very limited number of minority neighbors ... . "). 
391 Id. at 244-45. 
392 See id. (stating that a majority of whites surveyed indicated that they would try to 
move out ofa neighborhood in which they were outnumbered by minority residents). 
393 See Reynolds Farley, Charlotte Steeh, Maria Krysan, Tara Jackson & Keith Reeves, 
Stereotypes and Segregation: Neighborhoods in the Detroit Area, 100 AM. J. Soc.750, 776 
(1994) (describing the perception of some whites that minorities invite filth and crime into 
neighborhoods). 
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concentrations of white residents. 394 This process merges groups of white 
individuals, enhances their strength by concentrating resources, and creates a 
defined political base: suburban communities. This movement facilitates both 
control over and increased funding to local public schools.395 Additionally, 
there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between neighborhoods and 
schools. Prospective residents seek access to certain neighborhoods because of 
the quality of the surrounding schools; neighborhoods with good schools are 
highly attractive, adding to the value of the homes within those 
neighborhoods. 396 Indeed, there is little doubt that there is a strong relationship 
between neighborhood quality and school quality.397 So one way to view 
Walker is as an attempt to erect barriers to entry to white neighborhoods in an 
effort to "lock-up" the supply of these valuable benefits. From this 
perspective, the plaintiffs in the case have chosen to "stand and fight" to 
preserve neighborhood integrity against incursion from a rival racially, 
socially, and economically defined group. 
As has been discussed, current interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause 
have thrown the constitutionality of affirmative action programs into grave 
doubt. Indeed, this new skepticism of affirmative action has crept into the 
evaluation of governmental decisionmaking with respect to race in areas that 
do not necessarily implicate "classic" affirmative action problems. In the cases 
we have examined, the courts have stringently applied the strict scrutiny 
analysis to measures designed to redress past grievances. In doing so, 
however, each of these courts failed to undertake a meaningful compelling 
interest inquiry. Instead, the courts simply struck down the measures at issue 
because they were not "narrowly tailored" to achieve a compelling 
governmental interest-even though the courts had not fully explored what 
those compelling interests might be. These holdings are symptomatic of an 
approach that places stringent requirements on the government to first prove 
that it ( or a private actor it aided) caused the disparity its plan seeks to 
ameliorate and then prove that the underlying race-based decision was truly 
necessary to ameliorate that identified problem. The courts maintained that 
affirmative action remedies are only justified when they are employed to 
thwart current, overt acts of racism. 
394 Crowder, supra note 390, at 223. 
395 Rhodes Cook, Suburbia: Land of Varied Faces and a Growing Political Force, 55 
CONG. Q. 1209, 1209 (1997) ("The power of the suburbs to tip both the presidential and the 
congressional balance underscores the shape of American politics in the late 20th century."). 
396 Ellen, supra note 152, at I 513- I 4 (indicating that many people desire good schools 
and low crime and believe that the presence of minorities will decrease the quality of 
schools and neighborhoods). 
397 With few exceptions, suburban schools and schools with a larger percentage of white 
students enjoy enhanced funding, better physical plants and higher levels of maintenance, 
higher quality teachers, produce students who perform better on standardized tests, offer 
advanced placement and other specialized courses, and provide havens from rather than 
direct exposure to high levels of poverty and associated ills. powell, supra note 151, at 339. 
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The more appropriate question was: what is the appropriate remedy for the 
current effects of past discriminatory activity? As the previous discussion of 
several recent cases demonstrated, the effects of prior racial discrimination are 
still felt powerfully today because of "lock-in" effects in the areas of housing, 
education and job opportunities. Thus, even if all decisionmakers today were 
to act without regard to race, the effect would be to leave in place the 
"distribution" scheme previously set up that was admittedly based on race. 
At the same time, our discussion of social structural and social 
psychological approaches to discrimination leads us to believe that, left alone, 
members of socially and racially defined groups will act to exclude members 
of other groups. 398 Members of groups often allocate resources to those within 
their group and discriminate against outgroup members because to do so 
contributes to their own individual self-conception. This suggests that the 
levels of inequality among racial groups we currently observe can be expected 
to be quite durable. The government should not be disabled from attempting to 
correct for what are essentially the present effects of past discriminatory 
conduct. Rather, governments ought to be permitted to take into account how 
groups compete for resources. The courts, in applying significant constraints 
on governmental actors attempting to correct such wrongs, have created a 
regime which essentially says compliance with the Equal Protection Clause 
requires that the governmental actor simply cease engaging in harmful 
conduct, that it "sin no more." But once a defendant has been found to have 
violated the Equal Protection Clause, that violation cannot be cured simply by 
cessation of the harmful conduct. 
IV. PLACING INTERGROUP COMPETITION AT THE CENTER OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. V. SLATER 
In our survey of affirmative action cases in the "markets" of employment, 
education and housing, we have seen how anticompetitive behavior has 
allowed whites to lock-up access to benefits and opportunities. The courts 
have largely failed to consider the competitive dynamics underlying these 
cases, resulting in decisions that serve to maintain white competitive 
advantage. However, there is one important exception, and it appears in the 
Tenth Circuit's recent opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater 
("Adarand VJl ") .399 
The importance of the Tenth Circuit opinion lies in its explicit recognition 
of the deeply anti-competitive nature of the construction industry. The Tenth 
Circuit recognized that the inability to form relationships with powerful 
incumbents and the lack of access to exclusive social contacts can frustrate the 
ability of players to compete for bidding opportunities.400 The court 
398 See supra Part II. 
399 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000). 
400 Id. at 1170-71 (acknowledging "powerful" evidence that discrimination within and 
throughout the construction industry has created a "decidedly uneven playing field for 
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synthesized the behavior of white-dominated contractors, unions, and lending 
companies.401 The result, according to the court, is an anti-competitive force 
that served to lock-in white advantage in that marketplace.402 This recognition 
allowed the court to conclude that a compelling governmental interest 
animated the affirmative action program at issue and that the program was 
narrowly tailored to achieve the governmental interest, thus satisfying strict 
scrutiny review.403 
A. A (Very) Brief History of the Adarand Litigation 
The development of the Adarand litigation from its inception through its 
most recent sojourn to the United States Supreme Court has truly been a "long 
and winding road." The importance of the litigation, culminating but certainly 
not ceasing with the Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena4°4 
is not to be underestimated. The Adarand litigation concerned several 
provisions of the Small Business Act of 1958405 ("SBA") which presumed that 
minority group members were socially and economically disadvantaged when 
competing for federal contracting opportunities.406 The SBA set government-
wide participation goals in order to facilitate the award of federal contracts to 
small businesses controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals and required heads of federal agencies to adopt agency-specific 
goals for participation by disadvantaged businesses.407 At the time, the Surface 
Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987408 
("STURAA") provided that ten percent of all funds appropriated by the 
Department of Transportation be awarded to businesses controlled by socially 
and economically disadvantaged individuals.409 This goal was enforced via a 
contract term, the "subcontractor compensation clause," which paid a prime 
contractor a financial bonus when a portion of the dollar amount of the contract 
was expended on a disadvantaged business enterprise, or "DBE."410 
minority subcontracting enterprises seeking to compete in the area of federal construction • 
subcontracts"). 
401 Id. at 1168-72 (noting that prime contractors and lenders act as "old boy" networks 
and that unions "place before minority firms a plethora of barriers to membership"). 
402 Id. at 1168 (noting that the discriminatory practices of contractors, unions and lenders 
"precludes from the outset [minority] competition for public construction contracts"). 
403 Id. at 1 I 87. 
404 515 U.S. 200 (I 995) [hereinafter Adarand Ill] . 
4o5 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-657e (2000). 
406 Adarand Ill, 515 U.S. at 207. 
407 Id. at 206 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(l)-(2) (2000)). 
408 Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132 (1987) (prior to 1995 and 1998 amendments). 
409 Adarand 111, 515 U.S. at 208. 
410 Id. at 208-10. In 1989, the Department of Transportation entered into a contract with 
Mountain Gravel & Construction Co. ("Mountain Gravel") for the construction of a 
highway in Colorado. Id. at 205. According to the terms of the contract, Mountain Gravel 
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Adarand Constructors, Inc. ("Adarand") complained that it had submitted 
the low bid for the guardrail portion of a federal construction project funded 
under the STURAA, yet it was not awarded the contract.411 Instead, the 
contract was awarded to Gonzales Construction Company ("Gonzales"), a 
minority-controlled company that had been certified as a DBE.412 Adarand 
argued that the government's use of the subcontractor compensation clause 
denied it equal protection of the laws.413 In Adarand III, the Supreme Court 
held that all racial classifications, whether state or federal, must satisfy the 
demands of strict scrutiny.414 But because of the complexity of the regulatory 
scheme involved, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts to determine 
whether the subcontractor compensation clause at issue was narrowly tailored 
to achieve a compelling governmental interest.415 
Subsequently, however, the Colorado Department of Transportation granted 
Adarand DBE status, essentially providing it with the same preference that 
Gonzales had enjoyed.416 As a result, the Tenth Circuit ruled that Adarand's 
cause of action was moot, and directed that the district court dismiss the 
case.417 In 2000, the Supreme Court issued its second ruling in the Adarand 
litigation, and held that because Adarand's status as a DBE could be 
invalidated by the Department of Transportation in the future, it was not 
"absolutely clear that the litigant no longer had any need of the judicial 
protection that it sought."41 8 Consequently, the Court reversed the Tenth 
Circuit's decision, declaring that Adarand's "cause of action remains alive."419 
The issue on remand, however, was complicated by the fact that after 
Adarand III, the federal government significantly changed the highway 
would receive additional compensation for awarding subcontracts to DBE's. Id. at 209. 
The Court dubbed this the "subcontractor compensation clause." Id. at 210. 
411 Id. at 205 (noting that the Mountain Gravel's chief estimator submitted an affidavit 
stating it would have awarded that subcontract to Adarand had it not been for the 
subcontractor compensation clause). 
41 2 Id. 
413 Id. at 204, 212-13 . Because the government-actor was the federal government, 
Adarand alleged that the contract was inconsistent with the equal protection component of 
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 204. 
414 Id. at 227-29 (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), 
which applied an intermediate level of scrutiny for benign racial classifications adopted by 
the federal government). 
41 5 Id. at 237-39. 
41 6 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 169 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999) 
[hereinafter Adarand V] (noting that since Adarand now enjoyed the very preference it had · 
challenged, "it can no longer assert a cognizable constitutional injury"). 
4 17 Id. at 1297, 1299. 
41 8 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 224 (2000) [hereinafter Adarand 
VJ] . 
41 9 Id. (holding that while the possibility of the harm may be too conjectural to confer 
standing, it may not be so speculative as to render the case moot). 
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construction contracting program in an effort to comply with the Supreme 
Court's ruling.420 While the preference for minorities and women was 
continued, the changes made it more difficult for members of those groups to 
qualify for preferential treatment.421 For instance, the program incorporated a 
net worth limit in order to maintain DBE status,422 required that "businesses 
not exceed a certain amount of gross receipts in order to be eligible for the 
DBE program,"423 and set a time limit for any particular company's 
participation in the DBE program.424 Program regulations also specifically 
denounced the use of quotas and noted that the use of set-asides was prohibited 
except "when no other method could be reasonably expected to redress 
egregious instances of discrimination."425 Thus, in an effort to address the 
"narrow tailoring" prong of the strict scrutiny test, racial preferences were seen 
as a "last resort,"426 and the ten percent DBE participation goal was described 
as "aspirational" rather than as compulsory.427 
The difficult challenge presented to the Tenth Circuit on remand was to 
evaluate the program in both its pre- and post-1996 incarnations. 428 
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit determined that the program as structured before 
the relevant changes was unconstitutional as per Adarand III, but that the post-
change program, which still incorporated racial classifications, withstood strict 
scrutiny review.429 The Supreme Court ultimately denied certiorari.430 
420 Adarand VII, 228 F.3d 1147, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000). 
421 id. at I 191-95 (analyzing regulatory changes). 
422 49 C.F.R. § 26.67(b)(l) (2001) (stating that if an individual owner of a firm has a 
personal net worth in excess of $750,000, the presumption of economic disadvantage for 
that firm is rebutted); see Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1193. 
423 49 C.F.R. § 26.65(b) (2000); see Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1193. 
424 15 U.S.C. § 636G)(IO)(C)(i) (2000); 13 C.F.R. § 124.2 (2000); see Adarand VII, 228 
F.3dat 1193. 
425 49 C.F.R. § 26.43(b) (2000); see Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1193. 
426 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 707 (2d ed. 
2002) (describing the Department of Transportation regulations implementing the 
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century and suggesting that under the program, 
"racial preferences will be used only on a showing of a substantial disparity in contracting in 
particular areas and then only as a last resort upon a determination that race-neutral 
alternatives are inadequate"). 
427 49 C.F.R. § 26.4l(b) (2000). 
428 Adarand Vil, 228 F.3d at 1157-59. Because Adarand sought protective relief, the 
court decided it was necessary to consider the intervening statutory and regulatory changes. 
id. at 1158. However, in anticipation of potential future statutory and regulatory changes, 
the court also decided to address the constitutionality of the previous scheme as well. id. at 
1159. 
429 id. at 1187 ("[A]fter examining the current [preference program], we conclude that 
the 1996 defects have been remedied, and the relevant programs now meet the requirements 
of narrow tailoring."). 
430 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 102 (2001). Originally, the Court 
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B. Through the Lens of Competition: Adarand v. Slater 
The Tenth Circuit's decision is important because the court explicitly 
recognized the competitive dynamics of the market at issue in the case, and 
used the vocabulary of competitive analysis in its decision. At each step, this 
context informed the court's analysis, making an enormous difference in both 
the way it framed its inquiry and in the way it resolved the issues raised. The 
Tenth Circuit opinion subjected the post-Adarand DBE program to strict 
scrutiny review.431 As usual, the first question was whether there was a 
compelling governmental interest that might justify the use of race-conscious 
measures.432 
Unlike the earlier cases we have analyzed, the Tenth Circuit began its 
analysis by performing an in-depth evaluation of the "nature and the extent of 
the evidence" that Congress had before it with respect to discrimination in the 
construction industry.433 The Tenth Circuit rejected the notion that mere 
statements by members of Congress alleging discrimination in the construction 
industry could support the finding of a compelling government interest.434 
Instead, the court asked whether there was a "strong basis in evidence to 
support the legislature's conclusion. "435 
Relying on Croson's "passive participant" language, the court probed 
Congress's understanding of discrimination in the construction industry.436 
Here, the Tenth Circuit perceived two types of "discriminatory barriers to 
minority subcontracting enterprises. "437 The first type of discriminatory 
barrier prevented minority subcontracting companies from forming in the first 
instance; these were essentially "creation barriers. "438 The second type of 
discriminatory barrier was the "competition barriers" that impeded "fair 
competition between minority and non-minority subcontracting enterprises."439 
Both of these types of barriers to minority participation were supported by 
disparity studies demonstrating that minority subcontractors have been under-
granted certiorari. 532 U.S. 967 (2001). Subsequently, however, Adarand indicated that it 
did not wish to challenge the Tenth Circuit's determination on the DOT's state and local 
procurement program and instead wished only to challenge the DOT's direct procurement 
program. 534 U.S. at 103. Since the Tenth Circuit never addressed the direct procurement 
program, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Id. at 
111. 
431 See Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1164-87 (applying the compelling interest and narrow 
tailoring tests). 
432 See id. at I I 64. 
433 See id. at I 167 (emphasis in original). 
434 id. 
435 id. 
436 Id. 
437 id. at 1167-68. 
438 id. at 1168. 
439 id. 
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utilized440 and evidence suggesting that there was a sharp reduction in minority 
participation in federal contracting opportunities after the withdrawal of 
affirmative action programs.441 
With respect to creation barriers, the court cited several congressional 
studies which concluded that "discrimination by prime contractors, unions, and 
lenders has woefully impeded the formation of qualified minority business 
enterprises in the subcontracting market nationwide. "442 Discriminatory 
conduct by these actors included the presence of "old boy" networks in the 
family-dominated construction industry that refused to deal with minority 
firms, white dominated subcontractors' unions that excluded minority firms, 
and race-based denial of access to capital and lending opportunities by white 
dominated financial institutions.443 Taken together, these various barriers to 
entry prevented the creation of minority subcontracting enterprises that would 
ultimately compete with white dominated firms. 444 
On the competition barrier side, the court also pointed to myriad 
Congressional studies that detailed the manner in which existing minority 
firms were hampered in their ability to compete with established players in the 
industry. For instance, the court noted that the government had presented 
"powerful evidence" which suggested that: 
[C]ontracting remains a closed network, with prime contractors 
maintaining long-standing relationships with subcontractors with whom 
they prefer to work. . Because minority owned firms are new entrants to 
most markets, the existence and proliferation of these relationships locks 
440 Id. at 1172-73. 
441 Id. at 1174. 
442 Id. at 1168. 
443 Id. at 1168-70. 
444 Indeed, this was precisely the point made by Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in 
Adarand Ill. Justice Stevens explained the Congressional rationale which animated the 
presumptions of social and economic disadvantage at issue: 
I think it is particularly significant that the current program targets the negotiation of 
subcontracts between private firms . . . . In this case, in contrast, the program seeks to 
overcome barriers of prejudice between private parties-specifically, between general 
contractors and subcontractors. The [statutes at issue] embody Congress' recognition 
that such barriers may actually handicap minority firms seeking business as 
subcontractors from established leaders in the industry that have a history of doing 
business with their golfing partners. Indeed, minority subcontractors may face more 
obstacles than direct, intentional racial prejudice: They may face particular barriers 
simply because they are more likely to be new in the business and less likely to know 
others in the business. Given such difficulties, Congress could reasonably find that a 
minority subcontractor is less likely to receive favors from the entrenched 
businesspersons who award subcontracts only to people with whom---or with whose 
friends-they have an existing relationship. This program, then, if in part a remedy for 
past discrimination, is most importantly a forward-looking response to practical 
problems faced by minority subcontractors. 
515 U.S. 200, 261-62 (1995). 
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them out of subcontracting opportunities. As a result, minority-owned 
firms are seldom or never invited to bid for subcontracts on projects that 
do not contain affirmative action requirements.445 
Based upon the court's review of the evidence compiled by Congress, it 
concluded that minority firms had been systematically excluded from the 
ability to bid on construction projects, and that that systematic exclusion was a 
result of more than just "outright racism. "446 
More importantly for our purposes, the court acknowledged that such 
exclusion resulted from "insularity" and "informal, racially exclusionary 
business networks."447 In this manner, minority firms were the quintessential 
outsiders; they were on the outside of the inner workings of the established 
construction industry which functioned to support, sustain and champion 
insiders just as much as it discriminated against and excluded outsiders.448 
Disparity studies and the impact on minority firms after affirmative action 
programs were removed also supported this conclusion.449 Consequently, the 
court found that the government's post-Adarand DBE program which included 
a race-conscious remedy was justified by a compelling governmental 
interest.45° Finally, the Tenth Circuit also found that the DBE program was 
narrowly tailored, particularly because the new program emphasized "the 
continuing need to employ nonrace-conscious methods even as the need for 
race0conscious remedies is recognized" and because there were appropriate 
limitations on its duration.451 
The Tenth Circuit's willingness to recognize the existence and ramifications 
of competition was a solid first step toward a more nuanced and more accurate 
understanding of the intergroup conflict that is played out in affirmative action 
cases. By analyzing the anticompetitive behaviors engaged in by white firms, 
the court was able to recognize the structural problems created for black 
competitors. As courts begin to engage in this type of inquiry, a deeper 
understanding of competition will inform affirmative action cases. This shift 
would go a long way toward structuring "rules of the game" that are truly fair 
for all participants, regardless of race. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article explored the basic ideas of competition that underlie much of 
American society. Social science theory informs how blacks and whites 
445 Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1170 (citing Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in 
Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,042, 26,058 & nn.98-99 (1996) (Appendix: The 
Compelling Interest for Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement)). 
446 Id. at 1171. 
441 Id. 
448 See id. 
449 Id. at 1172-75. 
450 Id. at 1176. 
451 Id. at 1179-80. 
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engage in intergroup rivalry based on race. It then explores the process by 
which that intergroup rivalry is acted out, particularly the anti-competitive 
conduct in housing, education, and appointment. By combining these two 
strands of thought, we see that whites, as a group, can act in ways analogous to 
firms in a market, seeking to develop sustainable competitive advantage. The 
Article then applied this thesis to affirmative action cases in employment, 
education, and housing. In each area, it highlighted cases in which the courts 
failed to recognize competitive dynamics, and failed to engage in a meaningful 
compelling governmental interest analysis, resulting in erroneous conclusions. 
The Article then highlighted the Tenth Circuit's decision in Adarand VII as 
an example of a court properly recognizing competitive dynamics, resulting in 
a fair outcome. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Adarand VII is important 
because the court engaged in a meaningful compelling governmental interest 
analysis. In so doing, the court took a hard look at the competitive dynamics 
underlying the bidding for governmental contracts in the construction industry. 
By analyzing the process by which minority contractors have been 
systematically "locked out" of meaningful competition for bidding 
opportunities, the court was able to develop a nuanced understanding of the 
compelling governmental interest in the case. A nuanced and carefully 
calibrated narrow tailoring analysis followed from that conclusion. 
As more cases involving intergroup rivalry arise, courts need to understand 
and consider the dynamics of competition and how it plays out in "markets" 
such as education, employment, and housing. By adhering to outmoded, 
cramped approaches to notions of discrimination that focus solely on animus or 
racial "preferences," the courts are largely missing the point. Competitive 
dynamics underlie many aspects of black-white intergroup relations. By 
analyzing these dynamics, the courts will gain a powerful tool with which to 
create richer jurisprudence in this area. 
